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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Your medical data is for sale – all of it.”1 This warning comes from
Adam Tanner, of Harvard’s Institute for Quantitative Social Science, who has
published extensively on the topic of the business of selling medical records.2
When you visit your doctor, you may think “I’m telling my doctor my most
intimate medical secrets, and only my doctor knows about it.”3 Frequently,
however, your medical records are being sold,4 including your “[p]rescription
records, blood tests, doctor notes, hospital visits and insurance records.”5
This is a big business. Three quarters of all retail pharmacies in the U.S.6
sell their patients’ prescription records and healthcare information, as do major
health insurers, such as UnitedHealth, Anthem and Blue Cross Blue Shield.7 Your
medical records are often sold to data brokers who consolidate them into a
comprehensive profile about you. One data broker, for example, boasts of having
“500 million comprehensive, longitudinal anonymous patient records” sourced
from “over 100,000 data suppliers.”8 Another advertises the ability to create
“healthcare journeys”9 about patients created from a “collection of claims data for
1

Sam Thielman, Your private medical data is for sale – and it's driving a business worth billions,
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/10/medicaldata-multibilliondollar-business-report-warns.
2

See, e.g., Adam Tanner, Our Bodies, Our Data: How Companies Make Billions Selling Our
Medical Records (2017); Adam Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data (Jan.
10, 2017) [hereinafter Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data], https://productiontcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2017/01/11165252/strengthening-protection-of-patient-medical-data1.pdf; Adam Tanner , The Hidden Global Trade in Patient Medical Data, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE
(Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter The Hidden Trade in Medical Data],
https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/hidden-global-trade-patient-medical-data; Adam Tanner, How
Your Medical Data Fuels a Hidden Multi-Billion Dollar Industry, TIME (Jan. 9, 2017) [hereinafter
Your Medical Data Fuels Hidden Industry], http://time.com/4588104/medical-data-industry;
Adam Tanner , How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1,
2016) [hereinafter How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records],
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-data-brokers-make-money-off-yourmedicalrecords.
3

Thielman, supra note 1.

4

Id.

5

Tanner, Your Medical Data Fuels Hidden Industry, supra note 2.

6

Tanner, How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records, supra note 2.

7

Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data, supra note 2, at 7.

8

IMS HEALTH HOLDINGS, INC. ANN. REP. (2016), at 8.

9

Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data , supra note 2, at 8.
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280 million patients.”10 A New York City-based start-up claims to possess, as of
the date of this writing, 29 billion lab records of 250 million patients sourced from
leading national clinical labs, such as LabCorp and Quest Diagnostics, as well as
oncology and genetic testing labs.11 A San Francisco-based start-up claims to
have a “health map” that “links 150 complete real-time datasets for more than 320
million patients.”12
These profiles allow data brokers to track your diagnoses, prescriptions,
lab tests and more, as you interact with the healthcare system. Brokers advertise
their ability to create “patient journeys,”13 fine-tuned enough that if you visit a
CVS in Cleveland one day, and a Walgreens in Miami the next, or visit different
doctors in those cities, the broker will know.14 Data brokers seeking to downplay
the risks to patient privacy may refer to a patient’s medical records as a
“byproduct,” “exhaust,” or an “asset” of the healthcare organization to be sold.15
But this “exhaust” is the medical records of millions of patients containing the
categories of sensitive information one reasonably expects in medical records.
Brokers can not only track a patient’s use of prescription drugs, they can also
glean “insights” about that patient based on sensitive portions of his medical
history, such as his psychiatric history, substance dependency, STDs or history of
physical or sexual abuse.
Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
and its data protection regulations (collectively referred to hereinafter as

10

PRA Health Sciences acquires Symphony Health, scrip and prescriber data provider, PHARM.
COMMERCE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/business-and-finance/prahealth-sciences-acquires-symphony-health-solutions-scrip-prescriber-data-provider.
11

PROGNOS HEALTH INC., https://prognoshealth.com/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).

12

Press Release, Komodo Health, Veradigm and Komodo Health Partner to Create the Largest
Linked HER and Claims Dataset for Life Sciene Research (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.komodohealth.com/insights/2019/08/veradigm-and-komodo-health-partner-to-createthe-largest-linked-ehr-and-claims-dataset-for-life-science-research.
13

See, e.g., KOMODO HEALTH INC., https://www.komodohealth.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2020)
(advertising the ability to “unlock the truth about the patient journey through the U.S. healthcare
system.”).
14

Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data , supra note 2, at 11.

15

Id. at 7 (quoting former IMS executive: “We used to say, ‘Look, you are creating data as a
byproduct. It’s an exhaust from your system. Why don’t you take that thing and turn it into an
asset and sell it?’ That is the way we would get people to think about data as an asset …”).
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HIPAA),16 it is illegal for a healthcare organization17 to sell a patient’s18 medical
information without first obtaining the patient’s written authorization.19
Healthcare organizations and their data brokers may be seeking to bypass
HIPAA’s prohibition by describing the patient medical information they transact
in as “anonymized” or “de-identified.” Such assertions, however, are rarely – if
ever – verified by regulators or independent standards-setting bodies.
This lack of oversight may be coming at a price being paid by patients
who lose their privacy in the process. “Data scientists,” Tanner notes, can link
these patient profiles with consumer profiles “with a surprising degree of
accuracy.”20 This is a natural consequence of the fact that when enough
information is added to any patient’s profile, a broker will eventually obtain the
ability to identify that patient. Prominent security researcher, Ross Anderson,
noted this phenomenon when evaluating a proposal for creating a database of
16

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, adding a
new Part C to Title XI of the Social Security Act, comprising sections 1171–1179 of the Social
Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1320d–8 (Aug. 21, 1996); as amended by the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act or HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 1115 (Feb. 17, 2009), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, including Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information, codified at 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164 (Dec. 28,
2000; last amended, Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Privacy Rule]; Health Insurance Reform: Security
Standards, codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Subparts A (General Provisions) and C (Security
Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information) of Part 164 (Security and
Privacy) (Feb. 20, 2003; last amended, Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Security Rule]; Notification in
the Case of Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, codified at 45 C.F.R. Subpart D
(Aug. 24, 2009; last amended Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Breach Notification Rule]; and Civil
Money Penalties; Procedures for Investigations, Imposition of Penalties, and Hearings,
Department of Health and Human Services, codified 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164 (Apr. 17, 2003,
last amended, Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Enforcement Rule].
17

HIPAA’s provisions apply to organizations that it calls “covered entities” and “business
associates.” Covered entities includes a wide range of “health care providers,” including hospitals,
medical practices, pharmacies, clinical labs and many others; to health insurers, which HIPAA
calls “health plans;” and to entities that process medical claims, known as “health care
clearinghouses.” The term “business associate” applies to organizations that provide services to
covered entities that require the organization to receive access to identifiable information about the
covered entities’ patients or beneficiaries. See definitions for “covered entity,” “health care
provider,” “health plan,” “health care clearinghouse,” and “business associate” in 45 C.F.R. §
160.103. For brevity, this Article refers to covered entities and business associates collectively as
“healthcare organizations.”
18

HIPAA uses the term “individual” to refer to a “person who is subject of protected health
information,” which is, subject to limited exceptions, individually identifiable health information
transmitted or maintained by healthcare organizations. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. Most frequently
“individuals” are patients of a healthcare provider and/or beneficiaries or members of a health
plan. Outside of HIPAA, the term “individual” has many other meanings. Because the term
“individual” has ambiguous meanings outside of HIPAA, for clarity this Article refers to
“individuals” as “patients.”
19

45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(a)(5)(ii), 164.508(a)(4).

20

Thielman, supra note 1.
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Iceland’s medical, genealogy and genetic data.21 In examining the proposal,
Anderson noted that “it is eﬀectively impossible to de-identify … records …
which link together all (or even many) of the health care encounters in a patient’s
life.”22 “For this reason,” Anderson concluded, “a database of [such] medical
records must be considered to be personal health information.”23
Despite the red flags, observers often acquiesce to the notion that these
large volumes of sensitive medical information are “de-identified” in accordance
with HIPAA’s requirements. Tanner, for example, summarizes his belief that
“IMS and other data brokers are not restricted by medical privacy rules in the
U.S., because their records are designed to be anonymous:”24
“On the surface, it might seem impossible for a data miner to link
anonymized information about a patient from separate sources—CVS at
home in Cleveland today, but at Walgreens while on vacation in Miami
Beach next month—or from different doctors in these cities. Yet data
miners are able to match these files by getting pharmacies, insurers,
testing labs, electronic health record systems, and other suppliers to all
install the same de-identification software (for which they compensate the
data suppliers).
This software removes the personal details for each individual—such as
name, address, telephone number, and Social Security number—but
assigns that person the same anonymous patient identification key across
all locations using that de-identification system. ‘If they install that de-ID
engine at every source and it has the same algorithm, that means everyone
with the same PHI (personal health information) will get the same IMS
patient key,’ says Mark Degatano, who has advised IMS Health and
worked at rival data miner Symphony Health.
The ‘De-ID engine’ allows data miners to assemble a patient dossier with
thousands of data points spanning back years. The file does not include a
name, but lists age and gender, as well as what section of Cleveland she
lives in.” 25

21

Ross Anderson, The DeCODE Proposal for an Icelandic Health Database (Oct. 20, 1998),
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/iceland.pdf.
22

Id. at 3.

23

Id. at 4 (emphasis added).

24

Tanner, How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records, supra note 2.

25

Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data , supra note 2, at 11.
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This process, Tanner concludes, complies with HIPAA because “[HIPAA]
governs only the transfer of medical information that is tied directly to an
individual's identity.”26
Tanner synopsis of HIPAA, however, is incorrect. HIPAA’s protections
have never been limited to information that is “tied directly to an individual’s
identity.” On the contrary, HIPAA’s protections have always applied to “any
information … [with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe] …
can be used to identify a patient.27 Simply removing your direct identifiers (such
as your name, telephone number, address or social security number) from your
medical records has never been viewed of as sufficient to allow your doctor to sell
your medical records. As noted by Judge Posner when considering whether the
medical records of forty-five women who had received abortions where
adequately protected because their direct identifiers had been “redacted:”
“Some of these women will be afraid that … persons of their
acquaintance, or skillful ‘Googlers,’ sifting the information contained in
the medical records concerning each patient's medical and sex history, will
put two and two together, ‘out’ the 45 women, and thereby expose them to
threats, humiliation, and obloquy. As the court pointed out in Parkson v.
Central DuPage Hospital … ‘whether the patients’ identities would
remain confidential by the exclusion of their names and identifying
numbers is questionable at best. The patients’ admit and discharge
summaries arguably contain histories of the patients' prior and present
medical conditions, information that in the cumulative can make the
possibility of recognition very high.”28
In addition to including much of a patient’s medical history, such as a
patient’s medical appointments, care plans, medical claims, medications, lab and
radiology tests and results, history of psychiatric care, pregnancy care and dietary
services,29 medical records also often include a lot of demographic information
that “in the cumulative can make the possibility of recognition very high,” such as
the patient’s date of birth, gender, geography of residence, languages spoken and
marital status,30 as well as the patient’s birth place, adoption information,
citizenship, nationality, disabilities, religion and places of religious

26

Tanner, How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records, supra note 2 (emphasis
added).
27

42 U.S.C § 1320d–6 (emphasis added).

28

Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).

29

Specification 8.1, Resource Patient – Content, HL7 FHIR RELEASE 4 (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.hl7.org/fhir/patient.html.
30

Id.
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congregation.31 They may also include demographic information and medical
histories of the patient’s family members, including family members’ ages,
locations and medical conditions.32
HIPAA recognizes this reality by protecting medical records that describe
aspects of your life that can be used to identify you – such as what town you were
born in, where you grew up, where you work, or when you were married or got
divorced. To de-identify your medical records, therefore, your doctor must
remove all the information that can be used to identify you, not just directly but
also indirectly.
Tanner’s confusion about HIPAA’s requirements highlights a rarely
discussed ambiguity in how the label “de-identified” is currently applied to
medical information in the United States. On the one hand, there is HIPAA’s
definition of de-identified, which applies to health information that is devoid of
identifiable information and, therefore, can be disseminated free of HIPAA’s
comprehensive data protection safeguards. This is the definition used by Federal
agencies when they de-identify their own medical records for use by researchers
and the public. It is also the definition discussed by the US Department of Health
and Human Services (hereinafter referred to as HHS) and HHS’s Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) in their commentary and guidance regarding de-identification.
Because HIPAA’s form of de-identified information is devoid of identifying
information that can be used to harm patients, HIPAA contemplates that it can be
used and disseminated free of the restrictions HIPAA otherwise applies to
individually identifiable heath information.33
In the private sector, on the other hand, certain permissive “deidentification guidelines” give parties significant flexibility in how they apply the
label “de-identified.” This flexibility can be stretched so far as to label
information “de-identified” even in circumstances where there is a substantial risk
that it can be used to identify many, most or all of the patients involved. Because
this nominally “de-identified” information often can be used to identify patients,
it presents the same risks to patients as individually identifiable health
information. If the information is hacked, for example, it could be used to
discriminate against the patients or blackmail them.34 So it is not a coincidence
that these permissive “de-identification guidelines” anticipate that their form of
31

Id.; Specification 8.1.16, Resource Patient – Extensions & Profiles, HL7 FHIR RELEASE 4
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.hl7.org/fhir/patient-profiles.html.
32

Id.; Specification 94.1 Resource Family Member History – Content, HL7 FHIR RELEASE 4
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.hl7.org/fhir/familymemberhistory.html#FamilyMemberHistory.
33

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (“The requirements of [the Privacy Rule] do not apply to
information that has been de-identified in accordance with the applicable requirements of §
164.514 …”).
34

Tanner, The Hidden Global Trade in Medical Data, supra note 2.
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“de-identified” information will be secured in a manner that, in certain respects,
echoes what HIPAA requires for individually identifiable health information.
Healthcare organizations and their data broker customers are notoriously
secretive about their medical records transactions. “Pharmacies prefer not to
announce that they sell their prescription information,” Tanner notes, and “even []
employees are often unaware of the trade.”35 An industry insider notes that, “[i]t
was forbidden to ever mention that topic … It was the big secret.”36 “The trade in
patient data is so opaque,” Tanner points out, “that many even in health care and
government do not know about it.”37
Given this conspicuous secrecy, it is impossible to say which healthcare
organizations follow HIPAA’s express requirements for de-identification and
which utilize permissive “de-identification guidelines.” Tanner’s exposé raises a
number of red flags suggesting HIPAA’s requirements are not always followed.
In light of the confusion invited by applying the label “de-identified” to
information that can be used to identify patients, it is paramount that regulators,
compliance professionals, patient advocates and the general public understand the
significant differences between the standards applied by HIPAA and those applied
by permissive “de-identification guidelines.” This Article discusses those
differences in detail.
The discussion proceeds in four Parts. Part II (HIPAA’s Heartbeat: Why
HIPAA Protects Identifiable Patient Information) examines Congress’s
motivations for defining individually identifiable health information broadly,
which included to stop the harms patients endured prior to 1996 arising from the
commercial sale of their medical records. Part III (Taking the “I” Out of
Identifiable Information: HIPAA’s Requirements for De-Identified Health
Information) discusses HIPAA’s requirements for de-identification that were
never intended to create a loophole for identifiable patient information to escape
HIPAA’s protections. Part IV (Anatomy of a Hack: Methods for Labeling
Identifiable information “De-Identified”) examines the goals, methods and results
of permissive “de-identification guidelines” and compares them to HIPAA’s
requirements. Part V (Protecting Un-Protected Health Information) evaluates the
suitability of permissive “de-identification guidelines,” concluding that the
vulnerabilities inherent in their current articulation render them ineffective as a
data protection standard. It also discusses ways in which compliance
professionals, regulators and advocates can foster accountability and transparency
in the utilization of health information that can be used to identify patients.

35

Tanner, Strengthening Protection of Patient Medical Data, supra note 2, at 6.

36

Tanner, How Data Brokers Make Money Off Your Medical Records, supra note 2.

37

Tanner, The Hidden Trade in Medical Data, supra note 2.
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II.

HIPAA’S HEARTBEAT: WHY HIPAA PROTECTS IDENTIFIABLE PATIENT
INFORMATION

When Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996,38 it defined “individually identifiable health
information” to include “any information … that … [either]:
(i) identifies the individual; or
(ii) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe … can be
used to identify the individual.”39
Clause (i) covers directly-identifying information in your medical records – often
called “direct identifiers” or “obvious identifiers” – your name, addresses, social
security number, your telephone number, and the like.
Your medical history also includes other information that could be used to
identify you. Even if your direct identifiers are removed, you might be
identifiable from other information, such as where you were born, where you
grew up, your education history, where you work, when or if you were married or
divorced. For that reason, Congress included clause (ii) that applies to any other
information that reasonably can be used to identify you.
The ability of this “other information” to identify people is widely
recognized by researchers. Two decades ago, for example, Latanya Sweeney40
authored a highly-cited study where researchers reported that 87% of the U.S.
population were likely identifiable if you had access to their gender, date of birth
and zip code.41 These are sometimes called “indirect identifiers” because they
only indirectly identify patients. On their own, indirect identifiers are benign. But
when they are combined within one or more documents (such as a medical record
or your consolidated medical history), they often can be used to identify the
patient as easily as if you had her direct identifiers.
Gender, date of birth and zip code are included in most medical records.42
But they are not the only categories of indirect identifiers. HHS recognized that a
wide range of information could be combined to identify patients, as is the case
38

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191 (adding a
new Part C to Title XI of the Social Security Act, comprising sections 1171–1179 of the Social
Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1320d–8 (Aug. 21, 1996)).
39

42 U.S.C §1320d–6 (emphasis added).

40

See Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely (Carnegie Mellon
Univ., Data Privacy, Working Paper 3, Pittsburgh 2000).
41

Id. at 2.

42

See, e.g., Specification 8.1.14, Resource Patient – Detailed Descriptions, HL7 FHIR RELEASE 4
(Nov. 9, 2019), www.hl7.org/fhir/patient-definitions.html (demographics data includes, among
other categories, gender, date of birth, home address, marital status).

39

when combining a patient’s gender, date of birth, zip code, languages spoken,
race, diagnoses, dates of service, among other variables:
“It is not always obvious when information identifies the subject. If the
name and identifying numbers (e.g., SSN, insurance number, etc.) are
removed, a person could still be identified by the address. With the
address removed, the subject of a medical record could be identified based
on health and demographic characteristics (e.g., age, race, diagnosis).43
Accordingly, “removing only the direct identifiers” has never been
recognized as an effective means of de-identifying medical records because “the
resulting information would often remain identifiable, and its dissemination could
result in significant violations of privacy.”44 As HHS noted:
“Congress [] intended to go beyond ‘direct’ identification and to
encompass circumstances in which a reasonable likelihood of
identification exists. Even after removing ‘direct’ or ‘obvious’ identifiers
of information, a risk or probability of identification of the subject of the
information may remain; in some instances, the risk will not be
inconsequential.”45
The government had compelling reasons to protect all forms of
identifiable patient information. Before Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996,
medical information was treated like any asset to be sold on the open market. A
1994 report, for example, found that 40% of health insurers sold their patients’
medical information to lenders, employers and marketers without the patients’
permission, or even knowledge.46
Purchasers of patients’ medical information often used that information to
discriminate against those patients or otherwise harm them. A 30-year FBI
veteran, for example, was placed on administrative leave because his pharmacy
informed his employer that he was being treated for depression.47 In a separate
case, a banker used patient records to cancel mortgages of recently-diagnosed
cancer patients.48 In another case, a businessman purchased a medical practice
and held its patient medical records ransom until the patients paid a bounty to
43

Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918,
59,935 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160-164) [hereinafter the 1999 Proposed
Rule].
44

Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462,
82,708 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160-164) [hereinafter 2000 Final Rule].
45

Id. at 82,611.

46

Id. at 82,468.

47

Id.

48

Id.
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purchase their medical records.49 These were not isolated incidents. A 1990
survey, for example, found that 35% of Fortune 500 companies reviewed “…
people’s medical records before making hiring and promotion decisions.”50
The commodification of medical information put patients in a “catch-22.”
On one hand, a patient cannot obtain effective medical care without being candid
with their doctors, hospitals and pharmacists. On the other hand, the price of that
candor could result in the patient losing her job, a mortgage, or suffering other
forms of discrimination or personal embarrassment when her medical records
were sold to current or future employers, banks and whoever else was interested
in her medical history.
The harms caused by the free flow of patient health information were so
widespread, they became a recognized public health concern:
A 1993 Lou Harris poll found that 75 percent of those surveyed worry that
medical information from a computerized national health information
system will be used for many non-health reasons, and 38 percent are very
concerned … An ACLU Poll in 1994 also found that 75 percent of those
surveyed are concerned a ‘great deal’ or a ‘fair amount’ about insurance
companies putting medical information about them into a computer
information bank to which others have access.51
The lack of privacy protection reduced patients’ “trust in the health care
system and institutions that serve them.”52 As HHS noted, “[i]ndividuals cannot
be expected to share the most intimate details of their lives unless they have
confidence that such information will not be used or shared inappropriately.”53 In
the environment where patients knew their health information was for sale to the
highest bidder, many felt compelled to withhold critical information from the
healthcare system:
“[O]ne in six Americans reported that they have taken some sort of
evasive action to avoid the inappropriate use of their information by
providing inaccurate information to a health care provider, changing
physicians, or avoiding care altogether.” 54
A 1999 study found that “[t]o protect their privacy and avoid
embarrassment, stigma, and discrimination, some people withhold information
49

Id. at 82,467.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 82,467 (citing Harris Equifax, HEALTH INFO. PRIVACY STUDY, at 2, 33 (1993)).

52

Id.

53

Id. at 82,467-68.

54

Id. at 82,468.
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from their health care providers, provide inaccurate information, doctor-hop to
avoid a consolidated medical record, pay out-of-pocket for care that is covered by
insurance, and—in some cases—avoid care altogether.”55
The abuse was so widespread that clinicians often felt compelled to
protect their patients by censoring what they recorded in their patients’ medical
records:
“[T]he Association of American Physicians and Surgeons reported 78
percent of its members reported withholding information from a patient’s
record due to privacy concerns and another 87 percent reported having had
a patient request to withhold information from their records.”56
The lack of privacy protection had become a danger to public health, to
which Congress responded to by passing HIPAA. The new law not only
prohibited the commercial exploitation of medical information, but also included
significant penalties for its violations. If, for example, a violation is committed
with the intent to “sell, transfer or use” medical information “for commercial
advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm,” a violator can be imprisoned for up
to 10 years and fined up to $250,000.57 Congress tasked HHS with implementing
and monitoring specific rules on how medical information can be appropriately
used, maintained and disclosed that are today memorialized in four significant and
holistic data protection regulations known as HIPAA’s Privacy Rule,58 Security
Rule,59 Breach Notification Rule, 60 and Enforcement Rule.61 All four of these
regulations protect health information that can be used to identify a patient –
whether directly or indirectly.
III.
A.

TAKING THE “I” OUT OF IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION: HIPAA’S
REQUIREMENTS FOR DE-IDENTIFIED HEALTH INFORMATION
Defining Information that Does Not Need to be Protected by HIPAA

Although HIPAA sought to curb the sale of patient health information to
data brokers, it did not intend to bar legitimate uses of health information that
present no risk to patients. When a hospital, for example, notifies the public of the
55
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number of COVID-19 patients it has treated in the previous three months, that
number is incapable of identifying any of the patients. The Privacy Rule sought to
authorize such benign uses of medical information by introducing the concept of
de-identified health information.
The purpose of HIPAA’s definition of de-identified health information is
to describe a category of health information that can be freely disseminated by
healthcare organizations without restrictions, wholly unprotected by HIPAA’s
comprehensive data protection requirements.62 Because this category of
information is intended to be unprotected by HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, Security
Rule or Breach Notification Rule, the de-identification process itself is
responsible for safeguarding patient privacy. This can only be accomplished by
removing all information that can be used to identify those patients. So long as
the information cannot be used to identify any of the patients involved, it also
cannot be used to harm those patients.
Section 514(a) of the Privacy Rule defines “de-identified health
information” as “[h]ealth information that does not identify an individual and
with respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe … can be used to
identify an individual.”63 This definition is in harmony with HIPAA’s definition
of individually identifiable information, which is “any information … that …
[either]: (i) identifies the individual; or (ii) with respect to which there is a
reasonable basis to believe … can be used to identify the individual.” 64
The phrase “reasonable basis to believe” appears in both definitions.
HIPAA’s implementation specifications for de-identification – stated in Sections
514(b) and (c) of the Privacy Rule – give healthcare organizations procedures for
adhering to Section 514(a)’s standard. Those procedures start with the removal of
all direct identifiers. If a healthcare organization wants to replace those direct
identifiers with identification codes – what Tanner called a “anonymous patient
identification key” – then it must comply with the requirements of Section 514(c).
After the direct identifiers have been removed or replaced with identification
codes, the healthcare organization must comply with Section 514(b) to confirm
that it has removed all other information that could be used to identify any of the
patients.
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B.

The Inherent Dangers of Identification Codes and HIPAA’s Safeguards
Against Them

Under HIPAA, de-identification starts with the removal of direct
identifiers. In many instances, there is no need to use identification codes. If a
hospital, for example, wants to release statistics about the number of COVID-19
patients it has treated in the preceding three months, because this information is
simple statistics, there is no need to replace patient identifiers with identification
codes.
There are circumstances, however, where using identification codes is
called for. A researcher studying the comparative effectiveness of a particular
drug may need to look at relevant information regarding each patient in the study.
This patient-level medical data is also known as “microdata.” The healthcare
organization could provide a de-identified version of this microdata in order to
allow the researcher to conduct her study. If the study uncovers a surprising side
effect of the drug, the researcher could alert the healthcare organization about that
danger. The healthcare organization could then use the identification code to reidentify the patient’s records and take appropriate steps to address the health risk
to the patient.
Identification codes are very susceptible to compromise.65 The entity that
assigns the identification codes, for example, typically also possesses the ability
to identify the patients represented by those codes. This could occur directly, by
using the coding technology to reverse the code back into the patient’s identity.
But even if there are safeguards against this direct misuse, a party with the ability
to utilize the coding technology could use it to identify patients indirectly. The
party could accomplish this, for example, by using the technology to create
identification codes for all people within a certain location, or even for the entire
US. It could then compare those codes to the identification codes provided by the
healthcare organization to unlock the identities of all of the healthcare
organization’s patients.
Any compromise of the identification codes results in a compromise of the
patients’ identities and the medical records associated with those codes.66 In light
of the inherent risks of identification codes, HIPAA is very cautious about their
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disclosure of protected health information; and (ii) [i]f de-identified information is re-identified, a
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use with de-identified information. Section 514(c)67 places strict limitations on
their utilization:
A covered entity may assign a code or other means of record
identification to allow information de-identified under this section to be
re-identified by the covered entity, provided that:
(1) Derivation. The code or other means of record identification is
not derived from or related to information about the individual and
is not otherwise capable of being translated so as to identify
the individual; and
(2) Security. The covered entity does not use or disclose the code
or other means of record identification for any other purpose, and
does not disclose the mechanism for re-identification.
Section 514(c) places four requirements on the implementation of identification
codes. Each requirement corresponds to a way in which identification codes could
result in compromising patients’ identities:
1. The identification code must be assigned by the healthcare organization.68
This is because the ability to assign the code leads to the ability to directly
or indirectly identify the patients represented by the code.
2. The identification code must not be “derived from or related to
information about the [patient], or “capable of being translated so as to
identify the patient.” 69 If the code were capable of being translated to
identify a patient, this could easily result in the identification of the
patient.
3. The healthcare organization cannot disclose the mechanism for reidentification to any third party 70 because disclosing that mechanism
enables third parties to identify the patients. This echoes Section
502(d)(2)(i) of the Privacy Rule, which states that “[d]isclosure of a code
or other means of record identification designed to enable coded or
otherwise de-identified information to be re-identified constitutes
disclosure of protected health information.”71
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4. The healthcare organization can only use the identification code to reidentify its own de-identified health information.72 This is because, if a
healthcare organization gave a third party the ability to re-identify its
patients, it would also be giving that party the ability to re-identify the
patients’ medical records.
In light of the notorious secrecy healthcare organizations and their data
broker customers maintain regarding their medical records transactions, it is
impossible to assess whether they are complying with Section 514(c). Tanner’s
exposé, however, raises a number of red flags. Recalling Tanner’s discussion of
the data brokers’ software that replaces direct identifiers with identification codes,
he says:
[D]ata miners are able to match these files by getting pharmacies, insurers,
testing labs, electronic health record systems, and other suppliers to all
install the same de-identification software (for which they compensate the
data suppliers).
This software removes the personal details for each individual—such as
name, address, telephone number, and Social Security number—but
assigns that person the same anonymous patient identification key across
all locations using that de-identification system. ‘If they install that de-ID
engine at every source and it has the same algorithm, that means everyone
with the same PHI (personal health information) will get the same IMS
patient key,’ says Mark Degatano, who has advised IMS Health and
worked at rival data miner Symphony Health.73
Based on this passage, it appears that healthcare organizations, rather than
assigning the identification codes to their own patients’ records, are allowing the
software of the data brokers or the brokers’ vendors to assign the identifications
codes – that may be violating Section 514(c)’s first control.
It also appears that the healthcare organizations may be violating
Section 514(c)’s fourth control. Rather than using their patients’ identification
codes solely for the purpose of re-identifying their own de-identified information,
Tanner’s passage suggests that healthcare organizations are using them to
“sweeten the deal” for their data broker customers. The data broker customers
want the identification codes so that they can build medical histories about each of
the healthcare organizations’ patients and track those patients throughout their
lives. The healthcare organizations sell that ability by allowing the broker (or its
vendor) to assign identification codes to the healthcare organization’s patients
identifiers.
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The passage gives fewer indications regarding Section 514(c)’s second
and third controls. Use of the term “patient identification key” suggests that the
broker, or its agent who operates the “de-ID engine,” may be using cryptographic
algorithms to create the identification codes. As HHS has made clear, however,
the use of cryptographic algorithms to create identification codes does not comply
with HIPAA if the implementation otherwise violates Section 514(c).
In discussing a proposed use of a cryptographic hashing technique known
as “Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code” (or HMAC), for example, HHS
rejected implementations that allowed a data broker to track patients over time:
“… it appears the key is shared with or provided by the recipient of the
data in order for that recipient to be able to link information about the
[patient] from multiple entities or over time. Since the HMAC allows
identification of individuals by the recipient, disclosure of the HMAC
violates the [Privacy] Rule.” 74
The use of the cryptographic technology per se wasn’t the problem. If the
implementation of the HMAC identification codes complied with
Section 514(c)’s requirements, it would be permissible. The proposed
implementation, however, was configured to allow the “recipient to be able to link
information about [patients] from multiple [sources] over time.”75 This can only
be accomplished either if the healthcare organization shares the cryptographic key
with the recipient, or if the recipient (or its agent) provides the key for creating the
HMAC identification codes. Either case violates Section 514(c) and results in
giving the recipient the ability to identify the patients represented by those
identification codes.
Tanner’s work hints at another way identification codes can be
compromised. The reason data brokers want the patients’ identification codes is to
create comprehensive profiles or “dossiers” about those patients. “Data
scientists,” however, are capable of “… marrying anonymized patient dossiers
with named consumer profiles available elsewhere – with a surprising degree of
accuracy.”76 This capability, in turn, lets the broker compromise the identification
codes without even needing to compromise the cryptographic algorithm used to
create them.
In the Sweeny study, for example, researchers indicated that 87% of the
U.S. population could be identified using only their gender, date of birth and zip
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code.77 If a data broker possessed identification codes for 200 million patients that
are linked to their gender, date of birth and zip code, the broker would possess the
ability to compromise 174 million of those identification codes. For those 174
million identification codes, the broker’s ability to link those codes to the correct
patient is 100%. Furthermore, the number of identification codes that join this
“100% club” will inevitably increase with time as more and more medical
information is added to the other 36 million codes.
This issue exists even if no single data source contains all of the necessary
indirect identifiers, for example, where a broker has one dataset that only
includes the patients’ gender and age and then purchases a second dataset that
has their zip codes. When a broker has the ability to use identification codes to
link those two data sources, it also possesses the ability to use those codes to
identify a vast majority of the patients represented by them by merging the
patients’ indirect identifiers.
Healthcare organizations that give data brokers enough indirectlyidentifying information to identify a patient – whether that’s in a single data file,
or as a piece of the puzzle – appear to violate the spirit of Section 514(c)’s third
control, if not the letter. By disclosing those indirect identifiers together with an
identification code that the broker can use to link that patient’s other indirect
identifiers, the healthcare organization is disclosing a “mechanism for reidentification” that can be used to identify a substantial majority of its patients.78
C.

Removing Indirect Identifiers

Removing direct identifiers is a first step in the process of deidentification, but it is far from sufficient to create de-identified health
information. As previously discussed, “removing only the direct identifiers” is
inadequate because “the resulting information would often remain identifiable,
and its dissemination could result in significant violations of privacy.”79 Thus, if a
healthcare organization removes “only the direct identifiers,” the resulting
information continues to be individually identifiable health information that must
be protected in accordance with HIPAA’s Privacy, Security and Breach
Notification Rules.80
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Removing all of the potential indirect identifiers can be a daunting task.
First, there are many pieces of information that could potentially be used to
identify a patient. Sweeney and HHS discussed gender, date of birth, zip code,
race and diagnoses, but medical records can include many other potential indirect
identifiers, such as place of birth, ethnic origin, religion, languages spoken,
profession, event dates (such as admission to a hospital, discharge, length of stay),
number of children, living parents, education, and so on. Second, different
combinations of indirect identifiers can be used to identify different types of
people. Some individuals, for example, may be identifiable by combing their
dates of birth, religion and education, while another group may be identifiable by
criminal history, languages spoken, location of birth. This, in turn, leads to a third
challenge – because individuals can be identified by combinations of indirect
identifiers, it takes significantly more effort to address all of the potential
combinations. Any of those combinations can be linked to or combined with
external sources of information that can be used to identify the patients. As HHS
noted:
… the existence of external sources of records with matching data
elements which can be used to link with the de-identified information and
identify individuals (e.g., voter registration records or driver’s license
records). The risk of disclosure increases as the number of variables
common to both types of records increases, as the accuracy or resolution
of the data increases, and as the number of external sources increases.”81
Notwithstanding this analytical complexity, there are many situations
where a disclosure is very unlikely to identify a patient. When, for example, a
hospital wants to inform the public that “last month we treated fifteen COVID-19
patients,” it is very unlikely that statement can be used to identify any of the
hospital’s patients.
In light of these two aspects, Section 514(b) of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule82
gives healthcare organizations two options for confirming that a potential release
of medical information is sufficiently devoid of information so that “there is no
reasonable basis to believe [that it] can be used to identify [a patient].”83
The first, stated in Section 514(b)(1),84 embraces the analytical approach,
by allowing healthcare organizations to confirm that the information cannot be
that must be protected in accordance with HIPAA; see id., because they contain indirect identifiers
that can be used to identify patients.
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used to identify their patients using recognized statistical and scientific methods.
HHS’s model for this process is what Federal agencies use when they de-identify
their records before distributing them to the public.
The second, specified in Section 514(b)(2),85 helps healthcare
organizations in more straightforward situations, such as if a hospital wants to
make a public statement such as “Last month we treated 25 COVID-19 patients.”
It does this by giving healthcare organizations an easy-to-follow checklist.
1.
a.

Statistical Confirmation Method
The Language of Section 514(b)(1)

For health information to be “de-identified” in accordance with Section
514(b)(1), a healthcare organization must remove all patient-identifying
information until:
A person with appropriate knowledge of and experience with generally
accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering
information not individually identifiable:
(i) Applying such principles and methods, determines that the risk
is very small that the information could be used, alone or in
combination with other reasonably available information, by an
anticipated recipient to identify an individual who is a subject of
the information; and
(ii) Documents the methods and results of the analysis that justify
such determination …86
Section 514(b)(1), therefore, has substantive and procedural requirements.
Substantively, the healthcare organization must remove enough
information from a patient’s health record as to enable a qualified statistician to
confirm, using “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and
methods,” that the resulting information cannot be used to identify the patient.
The statistician’s assessment is an objective analysis based on “generally accepted
statistical and scientific principles and methods.” This analysis must take into
account the ways the output information can be combined with other available
information to identify patients. If, for example, a patient record includes her
gender, date of birth and zip code that could be correlated with publicly available
voting records, the statistician must assess the likelihood that the patient could be
identified if her medical records and voting records were combined.
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Procedurally, the qualified expert must document the statistical and
scientific methods she used, her results, and the analysis she used to justify her
results.
This two-step process mirrors how federal agencies confirm they have
removed all identifying information before they disseminate reports or data to the
public. To aid healthcare organizations in following the government’s approach,
HHS identified two key documents used by federal agencies.87 The first is the
STATISTICAL POLICY WORKING PAPER 2288 (hereinafter referred to as WORKING
PAPER 22) that describes the “generally accepted statistical and scientific
principles and methods for rendering information not individually identifiable”
used by federal agencies and described in clause (i) of Section 514(b)(1). With
respect to the requirements of clause (ii), HHS identified the CHECKLIST ON
DISCLOSURE POTENTIAL OF PROPOSED DATA RELEASES89 (hereinafter referred to
as the CHECKLIST), which describes the documentation federal agencies use to
memorialize that they utilized the appropriate statistical methods before releasing
it.
b.

Very Small Risk of Identification

Under Section 514(b)(1), health information can be labeled “de-identified”
only if there is a “very small” risk that it could be used to identify any of the
patients represented by such information.90 “Very small” is synonymous with
“very low probability”91 that is defined and measured by “generally accepted
statistical and scientific principles and methods” described in WORKING
PAPER 22.92 It is not something that can be selected; nor is it a “judgement call”
incapable of bona fide measurement in controlled settings. Rather, it is a threshold
based on objectively established statistical or scientific principles for protecting
87
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the confidentiality of patients’ identities against known risks. Because those risks
will “change over time to keep up with technology and the current availability of
public information from other sources,”93 what counts as “very small” in one
decade will be different from what constitutes “very small” in the next.
HHS’s definition of de-identification is premised on the idea that
information qualifying as “de-identified information” is no longer covered by
HIPAA and can be disclosed to the public without any restrictions.94 HHS’s
selection of WORKING PAPER 22 reflects this view because its methods are used
by “federal agencies that routinely de-identify and anonymize information for
public release.”95 As noted by WORKING PAPER 22, its techniques protect privacy
solely by removing identifiable information until the outputs can safely be
released to the public “without restrictions on use or other conditions.”96
The level of certainty, therefore, is measured by the understanding that
being “wrong” will violate the law and result in a data breach. For example, under
42 U.S.C. §1306(a), it is illegal under most circumstances to release any portion
of a tax return filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).97 Thus, when the
IRS releases statistical information based on tax returns it has collected, it must
remove all information that would violate Section 1306(a). If the IRS’s process
for “de-identifying” a tax return resulted in releasing identifiable information to
the public, that would be a violation of the law. Before releasing “de-identified”
tax return information, therefore, the IRS must have a very high level of
confidence that none of the information disclosed will result in a violation of
Section 1306(a). Similarly, to cryptography’s concept of “infeasibility,” the risk
does not need to be zero. But it must be small enough, based on known
vulnerabilities, to provide a very high level of confidence based on generally
accepted statistical principles and methods. 98
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This overlaps with HIPAA’s obligations under its Breach Notification
Rule. Under the Rule, a “breach” is defined as “the acquisition, access, use, or
disclosure of [identifiable] health information in a manner not permitted under
[the Privacy Rule] which compromises the security or privacy of [such
identifiable] health information.”99 Under the Breach Notification Rule, this is
“presumed to be a breach unless the [healthcare organization] demonstrates that
there is a low probability that the [identifiable] health information has been
compromised based on a risk assessment” of four factors.100 The first of those
factors is the “nature and extent” of the information involved. 101 If the healthcare
organization has removed patient identifiers, it must consider the remaining
identifiers and “the likelihood of re-identification.”102 If, for example, those
medical records contain indirect identifiers that could not be safely released to the
public, this is individually identifiable patient information and the healthcare
organization must perform the required risk assessment and/or warn patients that
their information has been released to an unauthorized party.
HHS’s own de-identification practices offer a useful illustration. In the
late 2000’s, HHS’s Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology (hereinafter referred to as ONC) commissioned a research team to
attempt to re-identify the health records of approximately 15,000 individuals that
had the 18 identifiers removed in accordance with Section 514(b)(2), the so-called
“safe harbor” method of de-identification. The research team compared those
records with consumer data provided by a national data broker and was able to reUSING APPROVED HASH ALGORITHMS, Computer Security Division, Information Technology
Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology (Aug. 2012) [hereinafter NIST SP
800-107], 6-9. Cryptographic algorithms protect the confidentiality of personal information by
rendering it indecipherable unless you have the “key” to unlock it. All deterministic algorithms,
however, can be compromised. If an attacker has an infinite amount of time and computing power,
she could break the algorithm simply by guessing new passwords until she unlocks the personal
information. This inherent vulnerability is known as a “brute force attack” or “exhaustive key
search,” and it is a fundamental risk that all cryptographic algorithms are measured against. This
risk is objectively measured as a function of (i) the number of mathematical operations it takes to
make each guess, multiplied by (ii) the number of mathematical operations that current computers
are capable of processing in a given time period. Based on these metrics, cryptographers have
defined “infeasibility” – their version of “very small” or “very low probability” in terms of the
physical limits on what an attacker could utilize based on current technologies. To be able to
compromise an algorithm based on a brute force attack, it should take many years of guesses
before the attack would be successful. Converted into probabilities, the chance that an attacker
succeeds on her first “lucky guess” is measured in the range of less than one-in-a-trillion trillion
trillion. This probability is not zero. Rather, it is a very low probability that is sufficiently robustly
that it accomplishes the intended goal against known vulnerabilities.
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identify two of approximately 15,000 individuals, or 0.013% of the population.103
As low as this percentage is, it has not been recognized as an “acceptable error
rate” when it comes to HHS’s own de-identified health information. A release of
the records of the two patients’ medical records would constitute a data breach
because their entities have been compromised.
Accordingly, when HHS’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(hereinafter referred to as CMS) releases de-identified medical claims data for its
beneficiaries in its “public use files,” CMS utilizes the full gamut of disclosure
limitation techniques described in WORKING PAPER 22,104 including:
• Drastically reducing the number of variables in a claim record;
• Suppressing rare diagnosis and procedure codes;
• Substituting claims from donor beneficiaries using an actual beneficiary as
the seed, or pattern, for the synthetic beneficiaries; donor claims were
found using a key variable from the seed and donor claims;
• Restricting the amount of information coming from any one donor and
always using multiple donors; a minimum of three donors contributing to
each single synthetic beneficiary claim set;
• Synthesizing secondary variable sets within the donated claims
conditioned on key variables, for added disclosure protection;
• Perturbing various claim dates by altering the start date of the claim set
used as the seed and proportionally altering the number of days between
claims;
• Coarsening expenditure variables, so that larger values were coarsened
into larger bins, and truncating both tails of the distribution (top and
bottom);
• Synthesizing provider information (institution and physician) by drawing
from empirical distribution conditioned on the synthesized geography of
the beneficiary;
• Suppressing rare combinations of institution and physician codes from the
data used to create synthetic claims. 105
In order for information to be considered de-identified under
Section 514(b)(1), therefore, the application of bona fide statistical and scientific
methods must be able to objectively demonstrate that there is a very low
probability that the resulting information can be used to identify patients by any
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party who is not authorized to obtain identifiable patient information under
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule. Unless that can be demonstrated, the information in
question does not satisfy Section 514(b)(1)’s standard for de-identification.
c.

Anticipated Recipients

Although HHS defines de-identified information as information that can
be safely disclosed to the public free of all restrictions in a manner contemplated
by Section 502(d)(2) of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule,106 HIPAA does not require every
instance of de-identified information to be released to the public. Healthcare
organizations can release de-identified information to specific entities rather than
the public. Section 514(b)(1) calls any entity anticipated to receive that medical
information an “anticipated recipient.”
The reference to “anticipated recipient” reflects important practical
differences between the ways in which de-identified medical information is
released to the public versus private parties. Healthcare organizations often
release information to the public on their own initiative. A hospital’s report
regarding its COVID-19 procedures is an example of such a release, and its
motivation is to provide the public with information about an important public
health issue.
In contrast to public reports, private data releases are often initiated by the
recipient and are intended to benefit the recipient, not the public, the healthcare
organization, or any of its patients. A data broker or researcher, for example, may
approach a healthcare organization and offer to pay substantial premiums for
granular patient medical records that go far beyond what the healthcare
organization would release on its own initiative. A data broker, for example, may
be looking for the full medical records – including specific diagnoses,
medications and even the doctors’ notes – about tens of thousands of patients with
an eye to analyzing that data or combining it with other data about those patients.
Because these requests are often unique, Section 514(b)(1) requires the
statistician’s analysis to address the unique aspects of information the data broker
– the anticipated recipient – is requesting. The analysis must also take into
consideration what additional information the data broker may have at its disposal
that could be used to identify any of the patients. If, for example, the broker is a
consumer reporting agency with access to significant volumes of detailed personal
information about the patients whose medical records are being provided, the
analysis must take that into account when applying the appropriate techniques
from WORKING PAPER 22. The statistician, for example, may conclude that the
data needs to be fictionalized to a greater extent to ensure that the medical records
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being provided cannot be linked or correlated with any personal information the
broker can access about those same patients.
2.
a.

The (Semi-) Safe Harbor Method

Redacting Identifiers in Accordance with Section 514(b)(2)(i)

The requirements of Section 514(b)(1) allow healthcare organizations to
use accepted statistical methods to ensure that the health information they are
releasing cannot be used to identify their patients; or, more precisely, to ensure
that “there is no reasonable basis to believe [that the information] can be used to
identify [their patients].” Those requirements, however, are extraordinarily
burdensome if a hospital simply wants to confirm the number of COVID-19
patients it treated the previous month. For those cases, Section 514(b)(2) of the
Privacy Rule107 gives healthcare organizations a simpler alternative.
If a hospital wants to confirm whether a simple statement is de-identified –
such as “Last month we treated 15 COVID-19 patients” – Section 514(b)(2)
allows the hospital to presumptively confirm that this statement is de-identified by
confirming that the following eighteen identifiers have been removed for the
patient, as well as her relatives, employers and household members:108
(A) names;
(B) all geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street
address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent
geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a zip code if, according
to the current publicly available data from the Bureau of the Census:
(1) the geographic unit formed by combining all zip codes with the
same three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people; and
(2) the initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic
units containing 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000.
(C) all elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an
individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date
of death; and all ages over 89 and all elements of dates (including
year) indicative of such age, except that such ages and elements may
be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older;
(D) telephone numbers;
(E) fax numbers;
(F) electronic mail addresses;
(G) social security numbers;
(H) medical record numbers;
(I) health plan beneficiary numbers;
(J) account numbers;
107
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(K) certificate/license numbers;
(L) vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate
numbers;
(M) device identifiers and serial numbers;
(N) web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
(O) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
(P) biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
(Q) full face photographic images and any comparable images; and
(R) any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, except
as permitted by [Section 514(c)] […].
Given Section 514(b)(2)’s “paint-by-numbers” approach, it is frequently referred
to as the “safe harbor” method of de-identification.
The use of the term “safe harbor” is misleading. Although the 18
identifiers offer a good rule-of-thumb for a wide range of routine disclosures, it is
still possible for identifying information to slip through the cracks. If the hospital
described above, for example, wanted to raise awareness about the infectiousness
of COVID-19 by informing the public that even young, healthy athletes can
contract it, it may be tempted to issue the following announcement:
“Even young, healthy athletes can get COVID-19! Just last week we
treated the most famous seven-foot baller who has three championship
rings to his name! If he can get it, so can you!”
This statement does not include any identifiers listed in
Section 514(b)(2)(i). Nevertheless, the statement likely could be used to identify
the patient either on its own, or in combination with other information.109
Members of the public, for example, could look up which athletes are seven feet
tall, and infer that the hospital is referring to a basketball player. They could then
review sports websites to find out which seven-footers have won three
championships and see what teams play in the vicinity of the hospital.
This situation is easy to detect in isolated statements. But it is often more
difficult to detect if the healthcare organization intends to release individual
medical records for thousands of individuals. Some of the more famous breaches
of identifiable patient information have occurred from the release of medical
records that complied with the redaction requirements of Section 514(b)(2)(i).
A famous example occurred when Professor Sweeney identified
Massachusetts Governor, William Weld, using hospital records that had been
redacted in accordance with Section 514(b)(2)(i).110 This was followed by a wave
109
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of studies that produced similar results. In a 2015 study, for example, researchers
identified patients in purportedly de-identified hospital records released by the
State of Washington111 that described incidents of venereal diseases, drug
dependency, alcohol use, tobacco use.112 Similar studies successfully identified
patients from redacted hospital data from California, Maine and Vermont.113
Section 514(b)(2)(i)-redaction is particularly vulnerable where a patient’s
longitudinal records are being assembled. In the ONC study described above, the
research team was able to identify approximately 0.013% of the population.114
When researchers have a chance to compare a patient’s medical records over a
period of time, the percentages can rise dramatically. A 2013 study examined this
phenomenon through evaluating the identification risks associated with a database
of biometric information that had been redacted in accordance with
Section 514(b)(2)(i).115 The study found that the ability to identify patients
represented in the database increased dramatically when researchers could
compare it to the patient’s longitudinal health information.116 When researchers
could utilize the known results for four consecutive PCV panels, for example,
they had 19.5% chance of uniquely identifying a patient in the redacted
biomedical database.117 When researchers had access to six consecutive panels,
the rate jumped to 89%.118
For these reasons, redacting medical records in accordance with
Section 514(b)(2)(i) is not an effective means for confirming that “there is no
reasonable basis to believe [that it] can be used to identify [a patient]” when the
healthcare organization has “actual knowledge that the information could be used
alone or in combination with other information to identify an individual who is a
111
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subject of the information.”119 Thus, even if all 18 of the required identifiers have
been removed, the data is not de-identified if the healthcare organization knows
that the information identifies one or more individuals.
b.

Healthcare Organizations’ Duty to Be Informed About Known Risks to
their Patients’ Confidentiality under HIPAA’s Security Rule

Section 514(b)(2)(ii)’s reference to the phrase “actual knowledge” can be
confusing. “Actual knowledge” is a legal term that describes the mental state of
an individual or an organization. For an individual, the phrase refers to the
contents of her mind – what specific facts or information was she consciously
aware of? Given the diversity of human experience, those contents can vary from
person to person. Accordingly, someone’s “actual knowledge” cannot be
presumed. There are many situations where a person may be ignorant of facts that
are well-known to others. The legal term “actual knowledge” is focused on a
person’s specific state of mind, not what that person should have known,
regardless of how commonly known or easy to learn the facts in question are.120
Assessing an organization’s actual knowledge is trickier still.
Organizations are made up of many individuals, often numbering in the hundreds,
thousands or tens of thousands. How does one assess what a company of 10,000
employees “actually knows?” Does the company “know” a fact if a single
employee is aware of that fact? Or if a majority of employees do? Or if certain
categories of employees know, such as corporate officers or employees with
specific job responsibilities?
HIPAA’s Security Rule and Breach Notification Rules answer some of
these questions by requiring healthcare organizations to know about potential
risks and harms to patient confidentiality. Each is particularly focused on uses or
disclosures of patient information that are not permitted under HIPAA’s Privacy
Rule. Healthcare organizations cannot choose to be ignorant about those risks and
harms.
HIPAA’s Security Rule, for example, requires healthcare organizations to
protect against “any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures” of their patient
information that would not be permitted by the Privacy Rule.121 This includes
protecting against any “reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security
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[...] of such information.”122 In furtherance of this obligation, healthcare
organizations must conduct “an accurate and thorough assessment of the
potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality” of the health information
they hold.123 Healthcare organizations, therefore, are required to inform
themselves thoroughly about potential risks and vulnerabilities to the
confidentiality of their patients’ information.
To aid healthcare organizations in conducting such risk assessments, HHS
commends special publications from the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (hereinafter referred to as NIST), 124 such as NIST Special Publication
800-30 (2002).125 Documenting all potential human, environmental and natural
threats is a significant undertaking. NIST SP 800-30 (2002) aids organizations in
creating an inventory by listing examples of such threats ranging from corporate
espionage and criminal hacking, on one hand, to poorly trained employees or
agents, on the other.126 NIST’s guidance regarding compromises of de-identified
information is located in NIST Interagency Report 8053 (hereinafter referred to as
NIST IR 8053).127 NIST IR 8053 identifies a number of such risks that could
result in the identification of individuals, such as patients, which it calls “reidentification attacks.”128 As with any other human threat, the motivations for re-
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identification attacks vary. NIST IR 8053129 lists six threat motivations that
overlap with those described in NIST SP 800-30.130
The ongoing risk assessments required by the Security Rule have
important implications for the level of “actual knowledge” that healthcare
organizations are required to possess. Their “actual knowledge” must be informed
by the “accurate and thorough assessment[s] of the potential risks and
vulnerabilities” they must conduct131 in order to protect the health information in
their possession from “any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards[…].”132
These assessments should document the types of risks, threats and hazards
described by NIST in its various publications, including NIST SP 800-30 and
NIST IR 8053. The Security Rule does not permit healthcare organizations to
simply “plead ignorance” or be “willfully blind” about well understood risks to
the confidentiality of their patients’ information. They cannot simply choose to be
ignorant of the many potential vulnerabilities of identification codes or of the
ways longitudinal health records can be compromised even if they are redacted in
accordance with Section 514(b)(2)(i).
c.

Healthcare Organizations’ Duty to Be Informed under the Breach
Notification Rule

HIPAA’s Breach Notification Rule also requires healthcare organizations
be informed about potentially harmful disclosures of their patients’ health
information. Under the Breach Notification Rule, a “breach” is defined as “the
acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of [identifiable] health information in a
manner not permitted under [the Privacy Rule] which compromises the security or
privacy of [such identifiable] health information.”133 Section 402 of the Breach
Notification Rule goes on to say that the “acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of
[identifiable] health information in a manner not permitted under [the Privacy
Rule] is presumed to be a breach unless the [healthcare organization]
demonstrates that there is a low probability that the [identifiable] health
information has been compromised based on a risk assessment of four factors.” 134
The first of those factors is assessing the “nature and extent of the [identifiable]
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health information involved, including the types of identifiers and the likelihood
of reidentification.”135
Even if the health information has had identifiers removed, any disclosure
of that information is a breach unless the covered entity can demonstrate that
either (i) there is a low probability that such health information is re-identifiable;
or (ii) if it is re-identifiable, that such health information has only been provided
to entities otherwise entitled to receive it under the Privacy Rule. Unless the
healthcare organization can demonstrate that that release presents a low
probability of re-identification by the recipient, patients must be warned that their
information has been released to an unauthorized party so that they can protect
themselves from the potentially harmful impact.136
As with the Security Rule, the Breach Notification Rule requires
healthcare organizations to be knowledgeable about relevant risks when health
information is released or used in ways that would violate the Privacy Rule.
Under Section 402, it is presumed that any disclosure of health information that
would not be permitted by the Privacy Rule is a “breach” – even for health
information that has had identifiers removed – unless the covered entity (or
business associate) can demonstrate that there is a low probability of
compromise.137 That documented demonstration must include reviewing the
identifiers that have been removed from the health information and assessing the
likelihood that such information – even with the removed identifiers – can
nevertheless be identified.138 The Breach Notification Rule, therefore, requires
that healthcare organizations possess this level of “actual knowledge” when they
release health information for purposes that would otherwise violate HIPAA’s
Privacy Rule.
D.

When De-Identified Information is Unsuitable for a Research Study

Not every research study can be conducted using de-identified patient
information. If a study protocol requires analyzing patients’ gender, dates of birth
and zip codes, for example, Sweeney’s study indicates that approximately 87% of
those patients will be identifiable. If the study requires analyzing 10,000 patients,
the researcher would obtain identifiable patient information for at least 8,700 of
those patients.
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This problem is well-understood by federal agencies. As noted in WORKING
PAPER 22, “[a]ll disclosure limitation methods result in some loss of information,
and sometimes the publicly available data may not be adequate for certain
statistical studies.”139 As further noted by the Confidentiality and Data Access
Committee (hereinafter referred to as CDAC), “[f]requently, the results of the
Checklist or other considerations, will mean that a file cannot be released for
public use, yet there is an acute need in the research community for detailed
data.”140
In these situations, the solution is not for the researcher or agency to
“stretch” the definition of de-identification. If the information can be used to
identify individuals, it is identifiable information regardless of the interests or
motivations of the researchers or the agency’s desires to release that identifiable
information.
Instead, the answer is to acknowledge the identifiability of the information
in question and to impose restrictions on how the researcher can access that
information in accordance with applicable law. CDAC refers to these restrictions
as “Restricted Access” arrangements.141
Broadly speaking there are two forms of “Restricted Access.” CDAC calls
the first “Licensing,” in which a “researcher must sign an agreement with the
agency which permits the installation of the restricted data on their computer in
return for meeting the agency’s conditions relating to maintaining confidentiality
of the data.”142 The contract a researcher must sign includes the following types of
provisions:
• Demonstration of a need for detailed data;
• Designation of those who have access;
• Statement of legal provision;
• Data security and enforcement/provision for inspection;
• Restrictions on use (prohibition against linking with other files);
• Restrictions on release of research results/adherence to agency policies;
and
• Return/Destruction of data provided.143
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The second form of “Restricted Access” supplements “Licensing” by
limiting the physical access to identifiable information to a “Research Data
Center,” where the data is housed in a monitored environment that restricts the
researcher’s access in various ways, such as:
• Review of research protocol;
• Formal agreement covering work to be done, data used, and types of
output;
• In-house files without identifiers;
• Limitations on types of analysis;
• No outside (linkable) data brought in by researcher;
• Dedicated computers;
• Review of data outputs;
• Inspection of material removed from site; and
• Physical presence of agency staff.144
HIPAA follows this general framework. When a research study cannot be
effectively conducted with de-identified health information, the answer is not to
stretch the definition of “de-identified.” Instead, the answer is to acknowledge the
identifiability of the information in question and to impose restrictions on how the
researcher can access that information in light of the risks to patient privacy.
In the hypothetical study described above, for example, the research
protocol required access to patients’ gender, dates of birth and zip codes for
approximately 10,000 patients. As per Sweeney’s study, this would result in
giving researchers access to identifiable information that can be used to identify
approximately 8,700 of those patients. Consequently, the researchers need access
to identifiable patient information that must be protected as such.
In these cases, it may be possible for researchers to use what HIPAA calls
a “limited dataset.” Under HIPAA a limited dataset is created by removing all of
the following sixteen identifiers about the patients, their relatives, household
members and employers:
(i) Names;
(ii) Postal address information, other than town or city, state, and zip
code;
(iii) Telephone numbers;
(iv) Fax numbers;
(v) Electronic mail addresses;
(vi) Social security numbers;
(vii) Medical record numbers;
(viii) Health plan beneficiary numbers;
(ix) Account numbers;
(x) Certificate/license numbers;
144
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(xi) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate
numbers;
(xii) Device identifiers and serial numbers;
(xiii) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
(xiv) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
(xv) Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints; and
(xvi) Full face photographic images and any comparable images.145
There is a significant overlap between the identifiers removed for limited
datasets and those removed under Section 514(b)(2)(i) under the “safe harbor”
method of de-identification. However, limited datasets can include a patient’s
date of birth, whereas Section 514(b)(2)(i) requires that the healthcare
organization only list the patient’s year of birth.146 Furthermore,
Section 514(b)(2)(i) requires that all specific dates be removed from de-identified
health information, which often makes it impossible to conduct studies looking at
impacts over shorter time periods. Limited datasets, on the other hand, can
include the full dates.
Because limited datasets can be used to identify patients, they are
individually identifiable health information protected by HIPAA.147 But HIPAA
allows limited datasets to be used for research, public health and health care
operations purposes.148 They can also be disclosed to a researcher provided that
the researcher enters into a “data use agreement” that conforms to the
requirements of Section 514(e)(4)(ii).149 This resembles CDAC’s “Licensing”
approach to “Restricted Access” by requiring researchers to enter into a “data use
agreement” with a number of patient privacy protections. Researchers, for
example, are required to report any unauthorized use or disclosure of the limited
dataset.150 Researchers also are not permitted to attempt to identify or contact any
of the patients.151 If the healthcare organization becomes aware of violations by
the researcher, the healthcare organization must take steps to cure the violation. If
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those steps are unsuccessful, the healthcare organization must terminate the
relationship and report the matter to HHS.152
In situations where limited datasets are insufficient for the research in
question, HIPAA provides additional pathways for healthcare organizations to
make their identifiable patient information available. One is under Section 508 of
the Privacy Rule that authorizes healthcare organizations and researchers to use
health information for research purposes pursuant to a patient authorization.153
This is a common pathway in clinical research involving human subjects that
would be used to test a drug or medical device. Such research is often conducted
in accordance with the FDA’s “Common Rule,” which governs how federally
funded clinical research is conducted, and is the de facto standard for clinical
research in the United States that involves human subjects.154 In such research,
“valid authorizations” are often obtained at the same time that a patient executes
the “informed consent” required under the Common Rule.
When the research requires the health information of a very large number
of patients and obtaining valid authorizations is not feasible, Section 512(i) of the
Privacy Rule authorizes healthcare organizations to conduct research under the
supervision of an Institutional Review Board (also called an IRB) or a Privacy
Board. These IRBs or Privacy Boards provide independent oversight over the
research activity in question, including the researcher’s data management
practices.155
HHS’s CMS utilizes three of these approaches for releases of its Medicare
claims information. CMS releases properly de-identified health information in its
“Public Use Files.” If a researcher has a bona fide need for identifiable patient
information for her research question, CMS gives researchers two options. One is
to obtain access to CMS’s limited dataset files that it has prepared in accordance
with Section 514(e)(2).156 In situations where the research requires the fullyidentifiable patient information, the researcher can request CMS’s “Research
Identifiable Files” (or RIFs). In conformance with Section 512(i) of the Privacy
Rule, access to RIFs is “reviewed by CMS’s Privacy Board to ensure that the
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beneficiaries’ privacy is protected and only the minimum data necessary is
requested and justified.”157
IV.

ANATOMY OF A HACK:

METHODS FOR LABELING IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION “DE-IDENTIFIED”
A.

Overview of Permissive “De-Identification Guidelines”

HIPAA’s requirements for de-identification are strict. Information that can
be used to identify patients is entitled to HIPAA’s safeguards, and the label “deidentified” is not meant to be a “work-around” to use or disclose patient
information in ways otherwise prohibited by the Privacy Rule.
Removing all of the information that can be used to identify patients
protects the patients from the misuse of that information by entities not entitled to
possess it, including by entities who believe they are not subject to HIPAA’s
jurisdiction. As discussed in Section D of Part IV, however, removing identifiable
information will often impair the use of that information for certain purposes. If a
research protocol studies the relationship between specific health conditions and
patients’ gender, dates of birth and zip codes, it may be impossible for that
research to be done with information that cannot be used to identify those
patients. As also discussed, HIPAA recognizes this reality by allowing multiple
pathways for researchers to access this identifiable patient information subject to
HIPAA’s protections.
In the private sphere, however, some organizations have taken a different
approach. When a purchaser is willing to pay a premium for medical records that
potentially could be used to identify patients, some organizations appear to have
chosen to downplay the identifiability of those records by labeling them “deidentified.” To justify labeling identifiable information “de-identified,” parties
have looked to certain permissive “de-identification guidelines.” This Part IV
examines in detail one of those guidelines, Concepts and Methods for De-
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Identifying Clinical Trial Data158 (hereinafter Concepts). A number of similar
permissive guidelines exist that share Concepts’ objective, methods and results.159
As will be discussed in detail below, the goal of these permissive “deidentification guidelines” is not to ensure that information labeled “de-identified”
is sufficiently devoid of identifying information so that it can be safely
disseminated as contemplated by Section 502(d)(2).160 Rather, it is to provide a
rationale for applying the label “de-identified” to patient information that often
can be used to identify many, most or even all of the patients involved. Because
their objectives are fundamentally different than those of Section 514(a) of
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, these permissive guidelines abandon HIPAA’s
implementation specifications in Sections 514(b) and (c).
If, for example, a data broker is willing to pay a healthcare organization to
replace its patients’ direct identifiers with identification codes controlled by the
broker (or its agent), these permissive guidelines ignore most of Section 514(c)’s
requirements. As a result, these guidelines allow the parties to label the healthcare
organization’s patients’ identification codes as “de-identified” even in situations
where the codes can be used by the broker (or its agent) to identify all of those
patients.
These guidelines wholly disregard Section 514(b)’s requirements. Rather
than requiring healthcare organizations to follow Section 514(b)(1)’s “statistical
confirmation” method or Section 514(b)(2)’s “safe harbor” method, these
permissive guidelines allow healthcare organizations to label identifiable
information as “de-identified” if a number of ambiguously defined or
administered conditions are satisfied.
The first requirement is that their approach applies only to “nonpublic data
disclosures.” These are disclosures a healthcare organization may make to any
commercial partner, for example, when a pharmacy sells its patients’ prescription
records to a data broker.
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The second requirement is that the data broker must contractually promise
not to abuse its ability to identify patients. The guidelines allow the parties to
decide for themselves how strict or enforceable this promise needs to be.
The third requirement is that the healthcare organization ensures that all of
its patients’ direct identifiers are removed. As noted above, however, Concepts
allows the data broker (or its agent) to replace the patients’ identifiers with
identification codes in contravention of Section 514(c). Also in contravention of
Section 514(c), Concepts allows the parties to label those identification codes “deidentified” even when the broker (or its agent) have enough control over how
those identification codes are deployed and utilized so that they can be used to
identify the healthcare organization’s patients.
As this stage, the permissive guidelines apply the label “de-identified” to
describe the identification codes and indirect identifiers the broker is purchasing.
This vocabulary is employed regardless of how easily the broker can use those
identification codes or indirect identifiers to identify some, many, most or even all
of the healthcare organization’s patients.
Because this form of “de-identified” information can be used to identify
patients, the permissive guidelines no longer require healthcare organizations to
apply “generally acceptable statistical and scientific principles for rendering
information not individually identifiable.” Instead, a healthcare organization need
only engage in informed speculation as to whether its patients’ identification
codes and indirect identifiers being supplied to the data broker will be used to “reidentify” the patients.
There are no “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and
methods” for predicting whether or not a data broker will abuse its ability to
identify patients. For this reason, permissive guidelines do not require healthcare
organizations use “generally recognized statistical or scientific methods” in their
informed speculation. Instead, healthcare organizations are only required to
perform (i) a set of loosely-described “examinations” of their data broker
customers; and (ii) a calculation that purports to indicate the likelihood that this
“de-identified” information will be used to “re-identify” the patients.
The “examinations” the healthcare organization is required to perform are
of the data broker’s security and privacy practices, its conflicts-of-interests and its
commercial motivations. Although they purport to be probative of addressing the
likelihood that the patient identifiers will be used to identify patients, the
guidelines do not require healthcare organizations to use evidence-based or
industry-recognized auditing standards or assessment criteria. As a result, the
healthcare organization getting paid to sell its patients’ medical records is free to
decide for itself what it deems to be adequate. Moreover, even if the healthcare
organization’s examination identifies “defects” in the data broker’s practices,
conflicts-of-interests or motivations, such defects do not disqualify the data
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broker from obtaining patient data. Rather, the healthcare organization can simply
treat those defects as remedied if the broker is willing to contractually agree to
addressing them based on whatever criteria the healthcare organization deems
adequate.
The calculation that healthcare organizations are required to perform is
described by the guidelines as a calculation of “actual risk” or “actual reidentification risk.” The inputs to this calculation, however, are not based on
generally accepted statistically or scientifically validated principles or methods.
Rather, the guidelines allow healthcare organizations to use any numbers that are
“defensible” based on the ability to find those numbers in any publication. Those
numbers do not need to be validated by generally accepted scientific or statistical
methods. As will be discussed below, the numbers do not need to be plausible or
even accurately reflect the published source. To be “defensible,” it appears all that
is required is that the numbers are published in any “body of work.”
Regardless of whatever numbers the healthcare organization decides are
“defensible,” the final calculation of “actual re-identification risk” does not need
to correspond to HIPAA’s definition of “very low probability.” The guidelines
give healthcare organizations broad discretion to select its own “acceptable risk
threshold” that can be orders of magnitude higher than HIPAA’s definition of
“very low probability.” In contrast to the ONC example,161 where 0.013%
corresponds to a roughly 1-in-7,500 chance of identification, these guidelines
allow parties to deem values as high as 33% or 1-in-3 as “acceptable,” a figure
that is over 2,550 times greater than the probability described in the ONC
example. To be clear, this risk is only deemed “acceptable” by the healthcare
organization and the data broker. No patients, security researchers or regulators
have deemed a 1-in-3 an “acceptable” threshold for de-identification.
As malleable as the definitions of “acceptable risk” and “actual reidentification risk” are, the permissive “de-identification” guidelines allow
healthcare organizations to significantly understate the actual identifiability of the
identification codes and indirect identifiers. This is because these permissive
guidelines only require the parties to assess the “identifiability” of each individual
release of health information regardless of what other “de-identified” information
the broker may also have available. So long as the broker promises not to abuse
its ability to identify patients, the healthcare organization can disregard any other
“de-identified” information the broker may possess, even if that information can
be used to identify all of the healthcare organization’s patients. These guidelines
allow parties to calculate the “actual risk” of identification to be 33%, even in
circumstances where the broker may possess the 100% ability to identify many,
most or all of the patients involved.
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B.

Concepts and Methods for De-Identifying Clinical Trial Data

Concepts and Methods for De-Identifying Clinical Trial Data,162 is among
a number of “de-identification guidelines” that purport to describe a method for
“de-identifying” patient information.
Concepts recognize two categories of “de-identified” information. One
category is public data releases. “For public data,” Concepts notes that “the
[healthcare organization] needs to make a worst-case assumption and protect
against an adversary who is targeting the [patients] with the highest risk of reidentification.”163 Accordingly, “[f]or a public data release, we assume … it is
necessary to manage maximum risk.”164 The way Concepts “manage[s] maximum
risk” is by applying the disclosure limitation techniques described in WORKING
PAPER 22, such as “generalization,” “suppression,” “randomization” and
“subsampling,”165 until the information can no longer be used to identify patients.
Because “there are no other controls”166 that protect patients’ identities, the data
itself must protect the patients. This appears to be similar to the objectives and
methods described in Section 514(a) and (b)(1) of the Privacy Rule.
The second category of “de-identified” information Concepts recognizes is
what it calls “nonpublic data disclosures.” These include patient information that
a healthcare organization supplies to a private party, for example, when a
pharmacy sells its patients’ prescription records to a data broker. Concepts’
methods for applying the label “de-identified” to “nonpublic data disclosures”
differ significantly from its requirements for public data disclosures.
Concepts’ approach to the “de-identification” of non-public patient
information is made up of the following eleven steps:
Step 1: Determine direct identifiers in the dataset.
Step 2: Mask (transform) direct identifiers.
Step 3: Perform threat modeling.
Step 4: Determine minimal acceptable data utility.
Step 5: Determine the re-identification risk threshold.
Step 6: Import (sample) data from the source database.
Step 7: Evaluate the actual re-identification risk.
Step 8: Compare the actual risk with the threshold.
Step 9: Set parameters and apply data transformations.
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Step 10: Perform diagnostics on the solution.
Step 11: Export transformed data to external dataset.167
As discussed below, Steps 2, 3, 5 and 7 of Concepts’ approach depart
significantly from a number of Section 514(a)-(c)’s requirements.
C.

Step 2: Mask (Transform) Direct Identifiers

The job of Step 1 in Concepts’ approach is to review the medical records
in question to inventory all of the patients’ direct identifiers, such as the patients’
names, residential addresses, government identification numbers, and the like.
The job of Step 2 is to “mask” or “transform” those direct identifiers.
Concepts defines “masking” or “transforming” as the “replacement of direct
identifiers with pseudonyms.”168 If, for example, a medical record originally
included the patient’s name and social security number, those direct identifiers
would be replaced with a pseudonym or identification code – such as
“7iZw4M2k1p.” The identification code would then serve as a proxy for patients’
names and social security numbers.
Under Section 514(b), as well as WORKING PAPER 22 and the
CHECKLIST,169 the first step of de-identification requires the removal of direct
identifiers. If, however, a healthcare organization wants to replace its patients’
direct identifiers with identification codes that represent those patients,
Section 514(c) requires healthcare organizations to comply with the following
four requirements:
1. The identification code must be assigned by the healthcare organization;170
2. The identification code must not be “derived from or related to
information about the [patient], or “capable of being translated so as to
identify the patient;” 171
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3. The healthcare organization cannot disclose the mechanism for reidentification to any third party; 172 and
4. The healthcare organization can only use the identification code to reidentify its own de-identified health information.173
Concepts’ interpretation of Section 514(c), on the other hand, disregards most
of its requirements. Rather, it describes Section 514(c) as follows:
… in the HIPAA Privacy Rule at §164.514(c), it is stated that any code
that is derived from information about an individual is considered
identifiable data. However, such pseudonyms are practically important for
knowing which records belong to the same clinical trial participant and
constructing the longitudinal record of a data subject. Not being able to
create derived pseudonyms means that random pseudonyms must be
created. To be able to use random pseudonyms, one must maintain a
crosswalk between the individual identity and the random pseudonym.
The crosswalk allows the sponsor to use the same pseudonym for each
participant across datasets and to allow re-identification at a future date if
the need arises. These crosswalks, which are effectively linking tables
between the pseudonym and the information about the individual,
arguably present an elevated privacy risk because clearly identifiable
information must now be stored somehow. Furthermore, the original
regulations did not impose any controls on this crosswalk table.174
In this passage Concepts describes a hypothetical crosswalk table that
links each patient’s name to her “pseudonym” (i.e., identification code). Anyone
possessing this crosswalk table, therefore, is able to identify all of the patients and
their medical records. Concepts acknowledges that the crosswalk is “clearly
identifiable information” that “arguably present[s] an elevated privacy risk.”175
But Concepts states that the “original regulations did not impose any controls on
this crosswalk table.”176 As a result, Concepts is unable to articulate any specific
restrictions that apply to it.
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Concepts’ conclusion that the “original regulations did not impose any
controls” is manifestly incorrect. Section 514(c) imposes multiple controls on how
that crosswalk table is maintained. If, for example, the healthcare organization
assigned the pseudonyms, but provided the researcher with the crosswalk table,
this would violate each of Section 514(c)’s second, third and fourth controls. As
HHS noted in its commentary to the “original regulations,” healthcare
organizations are “prohibited from disclosing the mechanism for re-identification,
such as tables, algorithms, or other tools that could be used to link the code with
the subject of the information.”177 Crosswalk tables are not exempt from
Section 514(c)’s requirements merely because they are named “crosswalk tables.”
As a result of its erroneous interpretation, Concepts expresses concern that
a crosswalk table is “clearly identifiable information.” Because the “original
regulations did not impose any controls,” Concepts recommends that any means
to “reverse th[e] pseudonym[s] [should be] tightly controlled.”178
Concepts, however, does not articulate specific criteria for what it means
by “tightly controlled.” It appears sufficient that a healthcare organization and a
data broker enter into any form of agreement or adopt policies to protect this
“clearly identifiable information” in a manner similar to how researchers
supervised by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) operate:179
Under the Common Rule, which guides IRBs, if the data recipient has no
means of getting the key, for example, through an agreement with the
sponsor prohibiting the sharing of keys under any circumstances or
through organizational policies prohibiting such an exchange, then
creating such derived pseudonyms is an acceptable approach.180
Concepts’ advice here, however, confuses HIPAA’s regulations that apply to deidentified information with its regulations that apply to identifiable information.
Those regulations are very different.
If identification codes are used with individually identifiable health
information, such as with a limited dataset or research information under
Section 512(i), then the parties are not governed by Section 514(c). Rather, they
are governed by HIPAA’s comprehensive safeguards for individually identifiable
health information, which include the protections and oversight set forth in
HIPAA’s Privacy, Security, Breach Notification and Enforcement Rules, and
could include policies and procedures along the lines referenced in Concepts’
passage. If, on the other hand, identification codes are to be used with properly
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de-identified information that is utilized in ways that fall outside of HIPAA’s
safeguards and limitations, then Section 514(c)’s strict controls apply.
HHS discussed this distinction when considering the proposed use of
HMAC encryption technology to create patient identification codes. Although the
proposed arrangement violated the controls set forth in Section 514(c) (as
discussed in Section B of Part III above), those codes could be used with limited
datasets, which are otherwise protected by HIPAA:
“The HMAC methodology, however, may be used in the context of the
limited dataset …. The limited dataset contains individually identifiable
health information and is not a de-identified dataset. Creation of a limited
dataset for research with a data use agreement, as specified in §
164.514(e), would not preclude inclusion of the keyed-hash message
authentication code in the limited dataset.” 181
Under Concepts’ approach, however, identification codes are not protected
by either HIPAA or Section 514(c). Rather, all that is required is that the parties
enter into an agreement or adopt a nebulous set of policies that facially appear to
manifest “tight controls.”
Concepts does recognize one of Section 514(c)’s four controls, namely
that the identification code must not be “derived from or related to information
about the [patient], or “capable of being translated so as to identify the patient;”
182
Once again, however, Concepts misstates what HIPAA requires.
Concepts’ understanding is based on its interpretation of guidance from
HHS’s Office of Civil Rights (hereinafter referred to as OCR) regarding
cryptographic algorithms:
“… in the recent guidelines from OCR, this is clarified to state that ‘a
covered entity may disclose codes derived from PHI (protected health
information) as part of a de-identified dataset if an expert determines that
the data meets the de-identification requirements at §164.514(b)(1).’
(HHS, 2012, p. 22). This means that a derived code, such as an encryption
or hash function, can be used as a pseudonym as long as there is
assurance that the means to reverse that pseudonym are tightly
controlled.”183
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The referenced guidance is taken from OCR’s “Guidance Regarding Methods for
De-identification,184 which states in relevant part:
“The re-identification provision in §164.514(c) does not preclude the
transformation of PHI into values derived by cryptographic hash functions
using the expert determination method, provided the keys associated with
such functions are not disclosed, including to the recipients of the
deidentified information.”185
Notably, Concepts omits a critical caveat in the OCR guidance, namely,
that cryptographic identification codes can only be used if “the keys associated
with such functions are not disclosed, including to the recipients of the deidentified information.”186 This echoes requirements of Section 514(c) as well as
HHS’s guidance regarding the HMAC algorithm.
Concepts’ omission of this caveat, along with the other controls in
Section 514(c), allows the parties to choose for themselves the ways they want to
“tightly control” the identification codes and the technology used to create them.
Concepts does not prohibit, for example, healthcare organizations from allowing
their paying customers to use their patients’ identification codes to aggregate all
of their medical information, even if that information could be used by the broker
or its agent to identify all of the healthcare organization’s patients. Nor does it
place any restrictions on who can assign the identification codes, even if that
assignment could result in the data broker or its agent having the ability to
identify 100% of all of the healthcare organization’s patients. In either case,
Concepts allows the parties to label the identification codes as “de-identified.”
D.

Step 3: Perform Threat-Modeling

Step 3 consists of two components:
(1)
identification of the plausible adversaries and what information
they may be able to access; and
(2)
determination of the quasi-identifiers.187
The second component of this Step – the determination of quasi-identifiers
– refers to creating an inventory of “quasi-identifiers,” another name for indirect
184
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identifiers. This process is similar to what is required by WORKING PAPER 22
when preparing de-identified health information in accordance with
Section 514(b)(1). The first element of Concepts’ Step 3, however, diverges
significantly from Section 514(b)(1)’s requirements.
This departure begins with the vocabulary Step 3 uses: Concepts
presupposes that the indirect identifiers and identification codes resulting from
Step 2 are already “de-identified.” From HIPAA’s perspective, these indirect
identifiers and identification codes continue to be individually identifiable health
information because:
1. The medical records continue to include all of the patients’ indirect
identifiers; and
2. The identification codes do not comply with the requirements of
Section 514(c).
From Step 3’s perspective, on the other hand, these identifiable patient records
can be labeled “de-identified” if the data purchaser promises not to abuse its
ability to use the indirect identifiers and identification codes to “re-identify” the
patients.
The second departure involves the assessment the healthcare organization
is required to perform. Under Section 514(b)(1)’s express language, the healthcare
organization must remove all potential indirect identifiers until it can be
demonstrated – by applying “generally accepted statistical and scientific
principles and methods for rendering information not individually identifiable” –
that there is a very low probability that the remaining indirect identifiers (and
identification codes) could be used by the data purchaser to identify any of the
patients.
Step 3, on the other hand, is not focused on ensuring that this information
cannot be used to identify patients. Instead, Step 3 requires the healthcare
organization only to document its informed speculation regarding whether or not
indirect identifiers (and identification codes) will be used to “re-identify”
healthcare organization’s patients.
Attempting to predict what a data broker would do with identifiable
patient information is very different than assessing whether information could be
used to identify patients. There is a large volume of “generally accepted statistical
and scientific principles and methods for rendering information not individually
identifiable,” many of which are discussed in WORKING PAPER 22. But there are
no “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods” for
predicting whether or not a data broker will abuse its ability to identify patients.
For this reason, Concepts does not require that the healthcare organization
utilize “generally recognized statistical or scientific methods,” much less methods
for “rendering information not individually identifiable.” Rather, Concepts only
requires that the healthcare organization use a method that is “generally known”
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and “justified” by a “body of work.” The “body of work” does not need to be
scientifically or statistically valid, and it does not need to be generally accepted by
scientists or statisticians. It simply needs to be “generally known.”
Concepts’ rationale for this approach is based on a puzzling misreading of
Section 514(b)(1)’s express language:
“The de-identification must be based on generally accepted statistical and
scientific principles and methods for rendering information not
individually identifiable. This means that the [healthcare organization]
needs to ensure that there is a body of work that justifies and evaluates the
methods that are used for the de-identification and that these methods
must be generally known.”188
Similar to how Concepts’ misreading of Section 514(c) omits three-fourths of
Section 514(c)’s express requirements,189 Concepts’ interpretation of
Section 514(b)(1) omits three of Section 514(b)(1)’s express requirements.
First, Concepts’ method for labeling information “de-identified” no longer
requires that it must be a “method for rendering information not individually
identifiable.” Second, it no longer needs to be a statistical or scientific method.
Although the method needs to be “justified” by a “body of work,” that
justification does not need to be statistically or scientifically valid, and the “body
of work” does not need to be bona fide statistical or scientific methods or
principles. Third, the method no longer needs to be “generally accepted.” Instead,
it is sufficient if the “body of work” is “generally known.” Concepts’
interpretation, for example, does not disqualify a method even if it is “generally
known” to be ineffective. Being “generally known” is sufficient.
Thus, so long as a data purchaser promises not to use the indirect
identifiers and identification codes it will be receiving to “re-identify” a
healthcare organization’s patients, Concepts allows the parties to label the
information “de-identified” notwithstanding the fact that it can be used to identify
those patients. And because Concepts permits the parties to apply the label “deidentified” to information that can be used to identify patients, it no longer
requires the parties to apply “generally acceptable statistical and scientific
principles for rendering information not individually identifiable.” Instead, the
healthcare organization needs only to engage in informed speculation as to
whether the indirect identifiers and identification codes being supplied to the data
purchaser will be used to “re-identify” healthcare organization’s patients.
Step 3 contemplates three potential ways that the identifiable patient
information could be “re-identified:”
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•

A deliberate attack, which happens when the data broker (or agent)
deliberately attempts to “re-identify” patients in the dataset;
• An inadvertent attack, which transpires when a data analyst working
with the data broker (or the data broker itself) inadvertently “reidentifies” someone in the dataset; and
• A breach, which occurs if there is a data breach at the broker’s
facility.190
Concepts characterizes these risks as “cover[ing] the universe of attacks.”191
The inconsistency between Concepts’ vocabulary and HIPAA’s language
makes it difficult to assess precisely what Concepts means by “re-identify” or
“breach.” For example, because the indirect identifiers and identification codes
are not de-identified in accordance with HIPAA’s requirements, there is no
unambiguous interpretation of what Concepts means by “re-identifying”
information that was never de-identified to begin with. Presumably re-inserting
the patients’ direct identifiers would qualify. But without a rigorous definition,
parties looking to profit from using patients’ medical records in ways that would
otherwise violate HIPAA could define “re-identification” narrowly to suit those
objectives. They could, for example, create “de-identified” profiles about patients
to generate “risk scores” about them using the patients’ identification codes.
Because those “predictive models” were created with patient profiles purporting
to be “de-identified,” a broker could decide that they could sell those “risk scores”
to the patients’ employers or insurers who wouldn’t be allowed to receive the
same substantive information if it were acknowledged to be derived from the
patients’ medical records.
Concepts’ definition of “a breach” is likewise ambiguous. It, therefore,
fails to define with any specificity how its identifiable form of “de-identified”
information should be assessed in determining whether a breach has occurred and
the extent to which it needs to be reported.
1.

What Kind of Contract Does a Data Broker Need to Sign to Allow Patient
Identifiers to Be Considered “De-Identified?”

In order to label indirect identifiers and identification codes “deidentified,” Concepts requires data purchaser “to sign a contract that contains the
relevant prohibitions.”192 Concepts, however, describes only three of these
“relevant prohibitions:”
• Prohibition on “re-identification;”
• Restrictions on linking the data with other datasets; and
190
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•

Disallowing the sharing of the data with other third parties. 193

As discussed in the previous section, Concepts does not offer an
unambiguous definition of what it means by “re-identification.” Concepts does
not discuss, for example, whether the use of its identifiable form of “deidentified” information in ways that would violate HIPAA if it were
acknowledged to be identifiable constitutes “re-identification.” Nor does it
provide clarity about what kinds of “restrictions on linking” and “sharing” are
specifically required. Nor does Concepts discuss other provisions that often would
be considered if the information in question were acknowledged to be individually
identifiable health information, such as:
• What are the consequences if the purportedly “de-identified” information
is deliberately or inadvertently “re-identified?” Should patients be notified
of the breach? Should HHS and State Attorneys General be notified?
• Should healthcare organizations be required to note such disclosures in
their accounting of disclosures to their patients?
• What kinds of disclaimers or limitations of liability are appropriate given
the identifiability of the information?
• Should patients be included as third-party beneficiaries in the event the
patient identifiers are “re-identified?”
• What security standards are required for safeguarding such identifiers?
• What data breach standards should be applied to assessing whether or not
a data breach has occurred?
• Who is authorized to evaluate the substance, suitability and effectiveness
of the data purchaser’s agreement?
Concepts does not condition its application of the label “de-identified” on how the
parties answer any of these questions.
Moreover, Concepts does not discuss the inherent weakness of contracts
when they are the only tool that is protecting patient privacy. In practice, contracts
often offer weak incentives to comply with their obligations. Contracts frequently
significantly limit the parties’ financial liability and disclaim liability to “third
party beneficiaries,” such as patients, who may be adversely impacted by the
parties’ behavior. Enforcing contracts in court is expensive and time-consuming.
As a result, many companies do not enforce their contracts and other companies
calibrate their compliance efforts against the “practical risk” hoping they can get
away with contract violations indefinitely. The 1978 version of Working Paper,
known as “WORKING PAPER 2,”194 discussed the inherent weakness of contracts in
describing the results of a compliance audit conducted by Bureau of Census. The
Bureau noted that:
193
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“… it was apparent that the sample purchasers either did not take their
signed agreement seriously, forgot it after a period of time, or were not
able to control handling of the file at their institutions. In a few cases the
agreement had been signed by a university purchasing agent and was
unknown to the actual users.195
This notorious compliance risk is why HIPAA extends its protections regardless
of what parties agree to in their contracts. Even if the parties attempt to shield
themselves from liability, the protections of HIPAA’s Privacy, Security, Breach
Notification and Enforcement Rules supply protections the parties may omit.
Step 3’s approach leaves it entirely to the discretion of the healthcare
organization to decide how it wants to protect its patients’ “de-identified” patient
identifiers. The contract can have fulsome protective provisions accompanied by
rigorous compliance monitoring. Or it could have ambiguous prohibitions that
give the data purchaser significant flexibility to decide for itself how it will use
the healthcare organization’s patients’ medical records.
E.

Step 5: Determine the Re-Identification Risk Threshold

Under Section 514(b)(1), medical records qualify as “de-identified” only if
there is a very low probability, measured using bona fide statistical and scientific
methods, that a broker could use the medical records to identify patients. As
previously discussed, for example, the HHS’s ONC commissioned a research
team to attempt to identify approximately 15,000 individuals whose medical
records were redacted in accordance with Section 514(b)(2)(i). The research team
compared those records with consumer data provided by a national data broker
and was able to identify two of 15,000 individuals, or 0.013% of the
population.196 This is equivalent to a 1-in-7,500 chance that the data could be used
to identify a patient. Although this low percentage has not been recognized as an
“acceptable error rate,” it illustrates that patient identifiability is measured using
bona fide “statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering
information not identifiable.”
Concepts’ Step 5, in contrast, allows healthcare organizations and their
customers to select their own “acceptable risk threshold.” Because this is a
selection process, not a statistical or scientific process, the parties are free to
select “acceptable risk thresholds” that are orders of magnitude higher than the
ONC example. Concepts allows the parties to agree to “acceptable risk
thresholds” that are as high as a 1-in-3 chance that a patient could be identified
from the medical records.197
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In a chart depicting 27 sample patients, for example, Concepts shows
“probability of re-identification” for each patient in the sample.198 On one end of
the spectrum, there are nine patients listed, each of whose medical records have a
“probability of re-identification” of 33%, or approximately a one-in-three
chance.199 On the other end are eight patients, each of whose records have a
“probability of re-identification” of 12.5%, or a one-in-eight chance.200 The
average “probability of re-identification” for each of the 27 patients is 22%,201 or
approximately a one-in-five chance that each patient’s medical records could be
used to identify her. There is no assessment of the likelihood that “at least 1
patient” can be identified, or “at least n patients202” can be identified, numbers
which naturally increase with every new patient added to the analysis.
Because Step 5 is a selection process, there is no statistical or scientific
justification for why Concepts’ “acceptable risk threshold” is approximately 2,500
times less secure than the ONC’s re-identification demonstration. Concepts,
however, offers non-scientific rationales based on its misinterpretation of
Section 514(b)(1)’s express requirements.
As discussed in Section D above, Concepts’ interpretation of
Section 514(b)(1) omits three express requirements. First, Concepts’ method for
labeling information “de-identified” no longer requires that healthcare
organizations use “methods for rendering information not individually
identifiable.” Second, it no longer requires healthcare organizations to use
statistical or scientific methods. Third, it no longer requires healthcare
organizations to use methods that are “generally accepted” rather than simply
“known.”
Consequently, the “acceptable risk threshold” no longer needs to be
equivalent to a very low probability as defined by the application of “generally
accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering
information not individually identifiable.” Instead, the parties are free to use any
way of “measuring re-identification risk in a defensible way and have a repeatable
process to follow that allows for the definition of very small risk.”203
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This “repeatable process” does not need to be validated by bona fide
statistical or scientific methods or principles. It simply needs to be included in a
“body of work” and “generally known,” even if unscientific. Concepts definition
of “generally known,” itself, appears to be remarkably lenient. Although Concepts
acknowledges that it would “difficult” to classify “undocumented methods or
proprietary methods that have never been published” as “generally known,” it
does not categorically prohibit healthcare organizations from doing so.”204
Concepts, therefore, deems a risk threshold of 33% acceptable because
other permissive “de-identification guidelines” also use the word “acceptable” to
describe 33%,205 and is “commonly used … based on the review/references in the
text.”206 Concepts does not assert that a 33% risk is an “acceptable” threshold
based on “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for
rendering information not individually identifiable” or that there is any
statistically or scientifically validated methods or principles that would assign a
one-in-three risk as “acceptable.” Nor does Concepts assert that a one-in-t risk is
acceptable to regulators, data protection researchers or the patients whose medical
records are being sold without their knowledge.
In order for the parties to select Concepts’ notably high “acceptable risk
thresholds,” Concepts requires an examination of the “context of the data”207 or
the “factors characterizing the [data broker] and the data themselves.”208 What
Concepts means by “context” and “factors” are the following:
• The data purchaser’s privacy and security practices;
• The data purchaser’s commercial motivations; and
• The data purchaser’s conflicts of interest.209
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If the healthcare organization has a favorable impression of the data purchaser’s
“factors,” Concepts permits the healthcare organization to apply the notably high
“acceptable risk thresholds” described above.
Like the “acceptable risk thresholds” themselves, however, the healthcare
organization’s “examination” of these “factors” has not been validated by
statistical or scientific methods. Rather, these factors are highly subjective in
nature, and are described as only being “in use informally.”210 Consequently, the
healthcare organization getting paid to sell its patients’ medical information and
selecting its own “acceptable risk threshold” is also being tasked with selecting
how stringently it wants to examine the “context of the data” justifying both.
1.

Examining a Data Purchaser’s Security and Privacy Practices

In order to “examine” a data purchaser’s security and privacy practices,
Concepts references “a collection of practices used by large data custodians”211
that are listed in a separate article written by one of Concepts’ authors.212 The
article identifies approximately 40 privacy and security controls, partially
excerpted below:213
Checklist of Practices That Must Be in Place at a Higher Threshold for
Re-identification Risk, as Detailed in Policies, Guidelines, and
Application Forms of Various Bodies
Controlling access, disclosure, retention, and disposition of personal
data

•
•
•
•
•
•

210
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Id. at 234.

Requestor allows only “authorized” staff to access and use data on a
“need-to-know” basis (i.e., when required to perform their duties).
Data-sharing agreement between collaborators and subcontractors has
been or will be implemented.
Nondisclosure or confidentiality agreement (pledge of confidentiality)
is in place for all staff, including external collaborators and
contractors.
Requestor will only publish or disclose aggregated data that do not
allow identification of individuals.
Long-term retention of personal data will be subject to periodic audits
and oversight by independent bodies.
Data will be disposed of after a specified retention period.
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•
•

Information will not be processed, stored, or maintained outside of [the
country], and parties outside of [the country] will not have access to
the data.
Data will not be disclosed or shared with third parties.

Neither Concepts nor the article it references describe how the checklist is
to be used to “examine” a given data broker. Because the checklist corresponds to
a list of data protection principles that can be found on the Internet, most of the
“practices” Concepts expressly requires could be auto-generated using off-theshelf software.214 Without a validated auditing protocol, the list on its own is
incapable of distinguishing between bona fide data protection controls from pro
forma documents that have been auto-generated.
On one extreme, the parties could interpret Step 5’s examination to require
a thorough review of the suitability and effectiveness of the broker’s privacy and
security controls. Such an audit, for example, could require a thorough review of
every documented policy, security incident report and breach assessments, and
complaints from personnel, contractors and customers. To ensure that the broker
is complying with its controls, the audit could require a review of sales and
supplier contracts, marketing materials, sales proposals and product requirements.
To ensure that the broker has appointed qualified personnel, the credentials and
qualifications of all security and privacy personnel could be reviewed, followed
by interviews to ensure that the individuals possess the requisite knowledge of
applicable regulations and industry standards, as well as the broker’s own internal
controls. To ensure that the broker’s compliance function is not subject to undue
influence, the broker’s organizational chart could be reviewed, along with the
employment agreements of compliance personnel to ensure that they do not have
a financial incentive to overlook significant compliance violations. To ensure that
these matters are reviewed by appropriately qualified professionals who do not
have any conflicts-of-interest, the statistician could require that the foregoing
matters are reviewed by independent security and law firms whose fees must be
paid regardless of the outcome of their assessments.
On the other extreme, the healthcare organization is free to interpret Step
5’s “informal” “examination” to require only that the broker produce a list of
auto-generated policies and procedures. Because Concepts does not require that
these documents be read or understood by a qualified professional, the healthcare
organization would never realize if the auto-generated policies are inconsistent
with contemplated transaction. Further, because the healthcare organization has
never compared the policies to the broker’s actual practices, it would never realize
if the broker has never complied with those auto-generated policies. Because the
healthcare organization has never reviewed the broker’s sales proposals or
214
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product requirements, the statistician would never learn if the broker intended to
breach its data use agreement. Because the healthcare organization has never
reviewed the qualifications of the broker’s security and privacy professionals, the
statistician is in no position to assess whether the broker has appointed qualified
personnel supervising those functions. Despite the fact that such an “examination”
only requires that the broker produce a set of unreviewed policies, Concepts
allows the parties to deem such an examination sufficient to warrant an
“acceptable risk threshold” of 33%.
2.

Evaluating Conflicts-of-Interest and Commercial Motivations

In addition to making sure that “security and privacy practices [have been]
put in place,” Step 5 calls for an examination of “issues [such] as conflicts of
interest, the potential for financial gain from re-identification.215 Concepts,
however, does not provide any framework for evaluating such conflicts or
commercial motivations. This is notable given that Concepts’ process itself gives
rise to a number of inherent conflicts, including the following:
• The data broker has a financial interest in labeling as much detailed patient
information as possible as “de-identified” because it enhances the broker’s
ability to commercialize it and reduce compliance costs;
• The healthcare organization supplying the patient information has a
financial interest in labeling medical records “de-identified” in situations
where the broker is willing to pay a premium for records that are classified
as “de-identified;” and
• Any “de-identification expert” hired by the parties has a financial interest
in obtaining the fees by assisting healthcare organizations and data brokers
in classifying as much of the detailed patient information as possible as
“de-identified.” If the “expert” is deemed “uncooperative” in supporting
the parties’ commercial objectives, the statistician puts future
engagements at risk.
Because Concepts does not identify its own conflicts-of-interest, it
provides no guidance on any of the following questions: (i) what it specifically
means by “conflicts-of-interest,” (ii) who is authorized to examine these conflicts,
or (iii) what criteria should be used to assess whether or not such conflicts are
problematic. The healthcare organization is free to conduct these examinations
based on any standard it deems suitable.
Examining the “potential for financial gain” is similarly problematic. A
principal motivation for HIPAA was the inherent financial interest associated with
selling patient information. The “potential for financial gain from reidentification” applies to all data brokers and healthcare organizations. Without
any protocols or assessment criteria for defining what Concepts means by
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“potential for financial gain,” healthcare organizations are free to decide for
themselves the scope of their examinations and the weight they give to them.
3.

No Disqualifying Defects: Remedying Defects Found in Informal
Examinations

Despite not providing any evidence-based auditing standards or
assessment criteria for their informal “examinations,” Concepts recognizes that it
is possible for healthcare organizations to find one or more defects in a broker’s
mitigating controls or commercial motivations.
None of those defects, however, appear to ever disqualify data brokers
from receiving patient identifiers. Rather, it appears that any defect in a data
broker’s controls or motivation can be deemed cured if the healthcare
organization beefs up its contract with the broker:
“The security and privacy practices of the [broker] can be manipulated
through contracts. The contract signed by the [broker] can impose a
certain list of practices that must be in place, which are the basis for
determining the threshold. Therefore, they must be in place by the [broker]
to justify the level of transformation performed on the data.”216
A real-world example of this is seen in Evaluating the Risk of Reidentification, written by one of Concepts’ authors, which involved the “deidentification” of patient prescription records that a hospital was providing to a
company developing a “database of prescription records.”217
The patient information in question was protected by Ontario’s Personal
Health Information Privacy Act, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as “PHIPA”)218
rather than HIPAA. Similar to HIPAA, however, PHIPA defines patient
information as “information that identifies a [patient] or for which it is reasonably
foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be utilized, either alone or with
other information, to identify a [patient].”219 Also like HIPAA, PHIPA mandates
that a “health information custodian” cannot disclose “personal health
information” about a patient without obtaining the patient’s consent.220
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The project ran into a snag when the application of bona fide statistical
techniques was deemed “unacceptable” to the data broker.221 Rather than
acknowledging the possibility that the patient information being requested was
identifiable, the parties’ strategy was to increase the “acceptable risk threshold” to
ensure that the medical records would be labeled “de-identified.”222 As noted in
the article, “[i]f it is not possible to obtain a good de-identification … the
threshold is increased […].”223
Increasing the threshold, however, came at a price: “[…] the higher
probability threshold must be balanced with greater security and privacy practices
by the data recipient.”224 The article then lists the controls described above that
“need to be in place” in order for the medical records to be labeled “deidentified.”225
A second snag arose when it was determined that the broker did not
actually have to have the relevant security or privacy practices in place. This
defect, however, did not disqualify the data broker from obtaining the “good deidentification” or the higher “acceptable risk threshold.” Instead of disqualifying
the data broker, the broker’s practices could be deemed adequate so long as it
agreed to implement additional controls in its data use agreement.226 There is no
requirement that the healthcare organization directly confirm that the practices
have been put into place, or that the healthcare organization actively monitor the
broker to ensure that none of its patients’ medical records are misused. As
discussed above, in practice, contracts often offer weak incentives to comply with
obligations viewed as cumbersome.
F.

Step 7: Evaluate the Actual Re-Identification Risk

Concepts entitles Step 7 “evaluate the actual re-identification risk.” Use of
the word “actual” implies Step 7 seeks to objectively measure the real-world risk
that the nominally “de-identified” patient identifiers given to the data broker will
be compromised. In reality, Step 7 only requires the parties perform a calculation
using numbers the parties are largely free to select. This calculation does not
measure anything “actual” about the risk to the data. Instead, it is a method for
generating numerical values that will be lower than the “acceptable risk
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threshold” selected in Step 5 without the need to consider the actual risk to the
data itself.
Step 7 is yet another instance of where Concepts abandons
Section 514(b)(1)’s requirement to apply “generally accepted statistical and
scientific methods for rendering information not individually identifiable.” As
discussed in Sections D and E above, Concepts only requires that the parties use a
method that is “generally known” in a “body of work” that gives “repeatable”
results. The “body of work” does not need to be statistically or scientifically valid,
nor does it need to be a generally accepted statistical or scientific method. The
“repeatability” of the numbers used does not need to be the result of a statistically
or scientifically validated measurement. Instead, it is sufficient if the
“repeatability” is a byproduct of the fact that the parties copy numbers from other
permissive “de-identification guidelines.”
The calculation contemplated by Step 7 echoes Step 3’s “threat modeling.”
As discussed in Section D above, Step 3 permits the parties to label patients’
indirect identifiers and identification codes as “de-identified” if the data broker
promises not to use that identifiable information to “re-identify” the healthcare
organization’s patients. Because this form of “de-identified” information can be
used to identify patients, Concepts no longer requires the parties to apply
“generally acceptable statistical and scientific principles for rendering information
not individually identifiable.” Instead, the healthcare organization need only
engage in informed speculation as to whether the indirect identifiers and
identification codes being supplied to the data purchaser will be used to “reidentify” healthcare organization’s patients. Under Step 3, this informed
speculation contemplates three potential ways that the identifiable patient
information could be “re-identified:”
• A deliberate attack, where the adversary deliberately attempts to “reidentify” individuals in the dataset;
• An inadvertent attack, where a data analyst working with the data broker
(or the data broker itself) inadvertently “re-identifies” someone in the
dataset; or
• A breach, where there is a data breach at the broker’s facility.227
Step 7’s calculation of “actual re-identification risk” builds on these
assumptions by requiring the parties to assign numerical values to each of these
possibilities by using the following formulas:
(1)
Pr(re-id, attempt) = Pr(re-id | attempt) × Pr(attempt), where the
term Pr(attempt) captures the probability that a deliberate attempt to reidentify the data will be made by the data recipient;
(2)
Pr(re-id, attempt) = Pr(re-id | attempt) × Pr(attempt), which
evaluates the probability of that data broker’s personnel may inadvertently
re-identify someone in the dataset.
227
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(3)
Pr(re-id, breach) = Pr(re-id | breach) × Pr(breach), where the term
Pr(breach) captures the probability that a data breach occurs at the
broker’s facility.228
Concepts anticipates that the inputs to these formulas will be informed by
the informal “examinations” described in Step 5. For formula (1), for example,
Concepts states:
“The actual value for Pr(attempt) will depend on the security and privacy
controls that the data recipient has in place and the contractual controls
that are being imposed as part of the data sharing agreement.”229
However, as discussed in Section E above, the examination of a data
purchaser’s “security and privacy controls” is not statistically or scientifically
validated process, and there are no objective assessment criteria or auditing
standards for conducting those examinations. As a result, the substance, quality
and results of this “examination” are wholly determined by the party financially
benefiting from it.
Moreover, Step 7 does not require the parties to use objective numerical
measurements. Instead, the parties can use any numbers they can locate in a
published article. For example, in discussing which numbers should be used to
calculate the “actual risk” of a data breach, Concepts says:
“Data for 2010 show that 19 percent of health care organizations suffered
a data breach within the previous year (HIMSS Analytics, 2010); data for
2012 show that this number rose to 27 percent (HIMSS Analytics, 2012).
These organizations were all following the HIPAA Security Rule. Note
that these figures are averages and may be adjusted to account for
variation.”230
The passage allows the parties to use any of the numbers that can be found in a
published article. If the parties want to use the 19% figure, they can. They can
also use the 27% figure. Or if they want to make an adjustment “to account for
variation,” they can do that as well.
Notably, Concepts does not require healthcare organizations to confirm
that the cited numbers are accurate. The 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT231 cited
in Concepts, for example, does not state that “Data for 2010 show that 19 percent
of health care organizations suffered a data breach within the previous year
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(HIMSS Analytics, 2010); data for 2012 show that this number rose to 27 percent
(HIMSS Analytics, 2012).”232 Rather, the 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT states:
“In 2012, 27 percent of all respondents to this survey indicated their
organization has had a security breach in the past 12 months (up from 19
percent in 2010 and 13 percent in 2008); of those who reported a breach,
69 percent experienced more than one.”233
The percentages reported in the 2012 HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, therefore,
did not apply to “health care organizations.” Rather, they applied to 250
individuals who responded to a survey.234 There is an enormous difference
between these two numbers. According to OCR’s ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON BREACHES OF UNSECURED PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION,235 for example,
OCR received 222 reports of data breaches involving 500 or more patients in
2012.236 The CMS’s MEDICARE PHYSICIAN AND OTHER SUPPLIER NPI REPORT
FOR 2012237 lists over 900,000 physicians or suppliers, which does not include
hospitals and many other “health care organizations.” Using OCR’s reported
numbers in the numerator and CMS’s numbers in the denominator would give a
percentage of approximately 0.025%. Concepts does not define what it means by
the terms “health care organization” or “data breach,” but it is clear that Concepts’
estimates of 19% and 27%, respectively, misrepresents what was reported in 2012
HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT, and are orders of magnitude off from the actual
percentages of healthcare organizations that experienced data breaches in those
respective time periods.
Notably, notwithstanding the inaccuracy of the statistics, Concepts appears
to sanction their use regardless of what a healthcare organization discovers during
its informal “examination” of a data broker’s security and privacy practices. So
long as there is a “body of work” that includes the numbers, regardless of how
inaccurate those numbers may be, Concepts allows the healthcare organization to
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use those numbers without taking into account any specific risks applicable to the
healthcare organization being “examined.”
Concepts does not give an example of how it converts informal
examinations of a data purchaser’s security and privacy practices into numerical
values, but other permissive “de-identification guidelines” do. De-identification
Guidelines,238 which closely follows Concepts’ blueprint and was reviewed by
one of Concepts’ authors, does.239
Like Concepts, De-identification Guidelines starts with the removal of
direct identifiers.240 Also like Concepts, De-identifications Guidelines allows a
healthcare organization to label indirect identifiers as “de-identified” if the broker
agrees to restrictions in its “data sharing agreement.”241 Following Concepts’
blueprint, De-identification Guidelines requires examinations of a data broker’s
“privacy and security controls”242 and “motives.”243 These examinations are not
based on statistically or scientifically validated criteria or auditing standards.
Rather, they are merely “qualitative assessments, resulting in values typically in
the range of ‘low,’ ‘medium,’ or ‘high.’”244
There is no scientific or mathematical foundation for converting the
informally determined grades into empirically validated predictions. In order to
perform the calculation, the parties are free to use whatever numbers they want if
they can be found in another permissive “de-identification guideline.” Deidentification Guidelines provides the following table that “may be used as a
guideline in determining what may be considered an acceptable estimate for the
probability:”245
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Chart of “Acceptable Estimates” Appearing in De-identification Guidelines
Privacy and Security
Controls
High

Medium

Low

Motives and Capacity
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low

Probability of ReIdentification Attack
0.05
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.6

Under Concepts, using these numbers is “acceptable” because they have
been previously published in a “de-identification guideline” written by one of
Concepts’ authors.246 And the process is “repeatable” because copying numerical
values from another “de-identification guidelines” will always result in the same
conclusion.
Similar to Concepts’ misapplication of the numerical values from 2012
HIMSS ANALYTICS REPORT discussed above,247 Concepts does not require these
numerical values to be accurate or reflect empirically validated facts or risks
applicable to the data broker. It is sufficient that the numbers used to calculate
“actual re-identification risk” are simply copied from another publication in order
to ensure the method is “repeatable.”
V.
A.

PROTECTING UN-PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION

Do Permissive “De-Identification Guidelines” Adhere to HIPAA’s
Requirements?

Concepts’ “de-identification” methods are substantially similar to those
described in other permissive “de-identification guidelines.” These guidelines
frequently cite one another as independent support and are often written or
reviewed by the same authors. De-identification Guidelines,248 discussed above, is
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one such example.249 It acknowledges that its “approach to de-identification … is
based largely on the risk-based de-identification methodology developed by [one
of Concepts’ authors].”250 And De-identification Guidelines justifies using the
unsubstantiated numerical values in its calculation of “actual re-identification
risk” because those numbers were published in GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION
OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION,251 also written by the same author. Concepts
and De-identification Guidelines both reference Evaluating the Risk of Reidentification as supplying the list of security and privacy practices that must be in
place before a healthcare organization can apply the notably high “acceptable risk
thresholds.” 252 The eleven-step process described in Part IV above, is
substantially similar to the method described in GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION
OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION.253
The goals, methods and results of these permissive “de-identification
guidelines” depart significantly from HIPAA’s requirements for de-identification.
For nonpublic data releases, their objective is not to ensure that information
labeled “de-identified” is sufficiently devoid of identifying information that it can
be safely disseminated as contemplated by Section 502(d)(2).254 As a result, their
form of “de-identified” information often can be used to identify many, most or
even all of the patients involved, and can present the same category of risks to
patients as individually identifiable health information. Accordingly, these
guidelines assume that such “de-identified” information will be protected in a
manner that, in certain respects (but not all), echoes what HIPAA requires for
individually identifiable health information.
Because their goals are different than HIPAA’s, permissive “deidentification guidelines” do not adhere to HIPAA’s specifications for deidentified health information. Concepts, for example, disregards three-quarters of
Section 514(c)’s controls on how identification codes can be deployed. Indeed,
permissive “de-identification guidelines” often expressly authorize healthcare
organizations to let data brokers apply patient identification codes:
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The [healthcare organizations] may use the same algorithm to generate the
pseudonyms for the [patients] so that the same [patient] in multiple
datasets will have the same pseudonym. This way the [data broker] can
perform anonymous linking of the datasets. Another example is where
[patients] need to be tracked longitudinally, and there will be multiple data
disclosures over time. To facilitate the anonymous linking of the different
datasets, it would be desirable to have the same pseudonym used for the
same [patients] over time.255
The use of the term “anonymous” in this section does not require that the
information is anonymous in the way it’s commonly understood. As with “deidentified,” it only means that the patients’ medical records have had the direct
identifiers removed and that the broker has agreed not to abuse its ability to use
identification codes and indirect identifiers to identify patients.
Nor do these “de-identification guidelines” adhere to the requirements of
Section 514(b)(1)’s statistical confirmation method. They do not, for example,
require healthcare organizations to apply “generally accepted statistical and
scientific principles and methods for rendering information not identifiable.”256
Nor are healthcare organizations required to consider all information reasonably
available to a broker if the broker promises that it will not “re-identify” the
information. Nor are healthcare organizations required to demonstrate that there is
a very low probability that the information could be used to identify patients using
generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering
information not identifiable.
In place of Section 514(b)(1)’s requirements, these “de-identification
guidelines” allow healthcare organizations to use non-statistical or non-scientific
processes so long as they have been published in any “body of work” and give
“repeatable” results. This is permitted even when those “repeatable” results are
simply the result of copying unvalidated or misquoted numerical values from
other publications.257 Healthcare organizations and their data broker customers are
also given wide latitude to select their own “acceptable risk thresholds,” which
can be orders of magnitude higher what generally accepted statistical and
scientific methods and principles would consider a very low probability. Although
these “de-identification guidelines” nominally require healthcare organizations to
examine their customers’ security and privacy practices, commercial motivations
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and conflicts-of-interest, those examinations are not conducted in accordance with
independently validated assessment criteria or auditing standards. As a result, the
substance, quality and results of these “examinations” are left solely to the
healthcare organization whose payment from the data broker is dependent on
favorable conclusions. Furthermore, the calculation of “actual re-identification
risk” utilizes inputs that are not the result of any statistically or scientifically
validated measurement instrument.
These “de-identification guidelines” also depart from Section 514(b)(1)’s
requirements regarding who participates in the process. Because Section
514(b)(1)’s express language protects de-identified health information solely
through the application of bona fide statistical and scientific methods,
Section 514(b)(1) only contemplates that a qualified de-identification statistician
is involved in its process.258 The scope of the “informal examinations” required
by permissive “de-identification guidelines,” on the other hand, covers a wide
range of topics far beyond the professional competence of a statistician. In order
for those “examinations” to be effective, the statistician would also need legal
expertise to meaningfully evaluate the data broker’s data use agreement,
information security expertise to evaluate the broker’s security practices, expertise
in privacy laws to assess the broker’s privacy programs, expertise in assessing
corporate conflicts-of-interest and corporate and human motivations, and
expertise in effectively conducting audits or internal investigations of each of
these very different domains. The “de-identification guidelines” do not articulate
if and which experts must be engaged to perform these wide-ranging
examinations. Nor do they discuss the professional qualifications or independence
of such professionals. Nor do the guidelines discuss that Section 514(b)(1) makes
no reference to having lawyers, security engineers, corporate ethics professionals
or auditors involved in determining whether patient information could be used to
identify patients.
The “de- identification guidelines” depart from Section 514(b)(2)’s
requirements as well. They do not require, for example, that healthcare
organizations remove all of the identifiers listed in Section 514(b)(2)(i). Because
they allow the parties to label information “de-identified” even in circumstances
where the healthcare organization knows the information can be used by the
broker to identify patients, the guidelines cannot be used in their current form
without violating Section 514(b)(2)(ii).

258

45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (describing the qualified statistician as a “person with appropriate
knowledge of and experience with generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and
methods for rendering information not individually identifiable.”).

96

B.

Do Permissive “De-Identification Guidelines” Encourage Healthcare
Organizations to Disregard HIPAA’s Requirements?

The permissive “de-identification guidelines” at times suggest that their
methods comply with HIPAA’s requirements. As discussed in Section C of Part
IV, for example, Concepts describes 514(c) of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule as not
imposing “any controls” on a spreadsheet that links patient identifiers with
identification codes. And as discussed in Section D of Part IV, Concepts interprets
Section 514(b)(1) as permitting healthcare organizations to use any method
justified by a body of work that is generally known. Although both are incorrect
interpretations of HIPAA’s requirements, they evince an aspiration to comply
with HIPAA.
There are other times, however, where permissive “de-identification
guidelines” acknowledge that their use of the word “de-identified” is distinct from
any legal definition of the term, including HIPAA’s. For example, GUIDE TO THE
DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION states:
“It should also be noted that the amount of de-identification that is applied
is influenced by external factors that must be taken into account:
precedents, regulatory requirements and signals, and the public’s
expectations … Regulators may indicate preferences for certain amounts
of de-identifications through regulations, orders, and guidance
documents.” 259
In this passage “regulatory requirements” are characterized as “external factors”
that exist independently of what it means for medical records to be “deidentified.” Further, the passage suggests that “regulatory requirements” are
simply “preferences” for “certain amounts of de-identification.” Both suggestions
indicate that these significantly permissive guidelines fail to understand HIPAA’s
framework.
Under HIPAA, de-identification is defined by its regulatory requirements.
Sections 514(b) and (c) are not “external factors,” and there is no such thing as
“de-identified health information” that does not comply with all of HIPAA’s
requirements. Information that does not meet all of those requirements remains
individually identifiable health information. Even when a large number of patient
identifiers has been removed – such as with a limited dataset – that information
must be safeguarded in accordance with HIPAA’s requirements. “Deidentification” is not something that can be “stretched” to meet the needs of a
healthcare organization or its financial objectives. As discussed in Section D of
Part III, HIPAA offers many options for using individually identifiable health
information for bona fide research purposes that do not involve misclassifying
patient information as “de-identified.”
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Despite the significant discrepancies between the guidelines’ definition of
“de-identified” and that of HIPAA, the guidelines do not explicitly acknowledge
them. Thus, by using the homonym “de-identified” to describe the results of their
process, these guidelines invite parties to disregard HIPAA’s express
requirements in favor of their own. This, in turn, invites healthcare organizations
to make the following presumptions:
• Patient identifiers do not need to be protected in accordance with the
security standards set forth in HIPAA’s Security Rule;
• Patients do not need to be notified in accordance with HIPAA’s Breach
Notification Rule when the patient identifiers have been accessed in a
hack or any other manner not authorized under the Privacy Rule;
• Neither the patient identifiers, nor the healthcare organization’s or data
broker’s disclosure, receipt or maintenance of such patient identifiers, are
subject to the jurisdiction of HIPAA’s Enforcement Rule;
• The patient identifiers can be used, disclosed or sold to any third party for
any purpose, including those that would violate HIPAA’s Privacy Rule
were the information acknowledged to be identifiable;
• The parties do not need to obtain patients’ authorizations in accordance
with Section 508260 of the Privacy Rule, even when the patient identifiers
are neither limited datasets261 nor obtained pursuant to a privacy board’s
waiver of authorization in accordance with Section 512(i) of the Privacy
Rule;262 and
• Patients do not need to be notified in an accounting of disclosures under
Section 528(a)(1) of the Privacy Rule,263 even when the patient identifiers
are neither limited datasets264 nor received pursuant to a valid
authorization.265
This confusion regarding the homonym “de-identified” can easily result in
harms to patient privacy. Patients, for example, have no assurance that any of
HIPAA’s safeguards will be applied to their medical records once they are labeled
“de-identified,” regardless of how easily those “de-identified” records can be used
to identify them. The permissive “de-identification guidelines” ostensibly require
that identifiable forms of “de-identified” information be protected with “stringent
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controls,” but they leave it to financially conflicted parties to determine how
“stringent” those “controls” must be.
Pleadings in Sorrell offer a glimpse of the potential impact of
misclassifying identifiable information as “de-identified.” An amicus brief filed in
the case alleged that data broker, IMS, used a cryptographic algorithm known as
“MD5” to generate identification codes that IMS used to track healthcare
organizations’ patients.266 It is also alleged that IMS continued to use the MD5 for
many years after MD5 had been publicly compromised. After over a decade of
warnings by security researchers, in the mid-2000s two teams of researchers
published that they had “cracked” MD5 using ordinary desktop computers. This
led to MD5 to be declared “cryptographically broken” in 2005267 and “unsuitable
for further use” by Department of Homeland Security’s Computer Emergency
Readiness Team in 2008.268 It appears, however, that IMS may have been
unaware that MD5 had been compromised. An IMS general manager, for
example, testified that its identification codes were secure and “there is no way
that you can actually reverse engineer the data back to a patient.”269
If these allegations are correct and IMS was unaware of MD5’s
vulnerabilities, this could be because it viewed patients’ identification codes as
“de-identified.” Although there are many ways that any identification code can be
compromised in a way that results in patient identification, IMS may have
concluded that it had no obligation under HIPAA to safeguard those identifiers.
IMS also may not have implemented appropriate systems to detect when the
patients’ identification codes are used or disclosed in a way that compromises
patient privacy. And it is unclear whether IMS would notify patients if such a
compromise occurred.
This contrasts sharply with how HIPAA treats identification codes. If, for
example, the identification codes were generated in accordance with
Section 514(c), HIPAA’s Security Rule would require healthcare organizations
assigning those codes to conduct thorough and accurate risk assessments of the
potential risks and vulnerabilities.270 It would also require healthcare
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organizations to protect against “any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards.”271
Healthcare organizations would be required to be informed about MD5’s wellknown defects. They also would be required to implement systems to detect any
compromise of their patients’ identification codes and to notify patients if a
compromise results in the use or disclosure of their patients’ medical information
in unauthorized ways or to unauthorized parties.
C.

Are Permissive “De-Identification Guidelines” Being Utilized by
Healthcare Organizations in Lieu of HIPAA’s Requirements?

Given the notorious secrecy surrounding the sale of patient medical
information,272 it is impossible to be certain whether or how many healthcare
organizations utilize the permissive “de-identification guidelines” in lieu of
HIPAA’s express requirements. Tanner’s exposé, however, indicates that at least
some healthcare organizations may.
Recalling Tanner’s discussion of data broker software that replaces direct
identifiers with identification codes,273 it appears that a number of healthcare
organizations allow data brokers to assign their patients’ identification codes.
Tanner’s account is bolstered by information in the Sorrell litigation, where
testimony from an employee of one of IMS’s agents, Verispan, revealed the way
IMS’ agent used “linking codes” to allow IMS to follow patients throughout their
lives:
“What we do is … strip out all of the identifiable information, and replace
it with the serial linking code […] so that every time an entity comes into
the database, it’s replaced with the same code. So you can follow an
individual over time […]”274
On its face, this practice appears to violate a number of Section 514(c)’s
controls, as more fully discussed in Section B of Part III above. Not only do
healthcare organizations allow data brokers (or their agents) to apply the patients’
identification codes, they also allow the brokers (on their own or through agents)
to control how those codes are used. They can be used by a broker and its agent,
for example, to aggregate an unlimited amount of additional information about
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patients. That ability, in turn, gives the broker (or its agent) the ability to use those
identification codes – alone or in combination with the technology used to
generate them or other patient information – to identify many, most or all of the
healthcare organizations’ patients. Regardless of whether or not the broker (or its
agent) ever abuses this ability, the healthcare organization has disclosed patient
information that could be used – alone or in combination with other information –
to identify its patients.
The permissive “de-identification guidelines” place no specific restrictions
on how identification codes are utilized. Consequently, they permit healthcare
organizations to apply the label “de-identified” to their patients’ identification
codes even in circumstances where they can be used – directly or indirectly – to
identify 100% of the healthcare organizations’ patients.
With respect to HIPAA’s requirements in Section 514(b), Tanner notes
that “[d]ata scientists can now circumvent HIPAA’s privacy protections by …
marrying [data brokers’] anonymized patient dossiers with named consumer
profiles available elsewhere – with a surprising degree of accuracy.”275 On its
face, this appears to contradict Section 514(b)(1)’s requirement that “the risk is
very small that the information could be used, alone or in combination with other
reasonably available information, by the [data broker] to identify [a patient].”276
It also appears to contradict Section 514(b)(2)(ii) that does not allow information
to be considered de-identified when the healthcare organization knows that “the
information could be used alone or in combination with other information to
identify [a patient].”277
Permissive “de-identification guidelines” take a markedly different
approach. Once a data broker enters into a contract, the healthcare organization
can disregard any “other information” available to the data broker that could be
combined with patient medical information to identify patients. As a result, even
when the identification codes and “other information” can be used by the data
broker to identify 100% of the healthcare organization’s patients, these guidelines
allow the label “de-identified” to be applied.
D.

Do Permissive “De-Identification Guidelines” Provide an Effective Data
Protection Alternative to HIPAA’s Definition of De-Identified Information?

In their current form, permissive “de-identification guidelines” incorporate
too many vulnerabilities to operate as an alternative to HIPAA’s data protection
framework. These guidelines, for example, provide no unambiguous or
measurable requirements for what kinds of data use agreements warrant allowing
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identifiable information to be labeled “de-identified.” They also provide no
unambiguous or measurable requirements for assessing a data broker’s security or
privacy practices, conflicts-of-interests or commercial motivations. Nor do they
provide unambiguous or measurable auditing criteria to ensure that the
examinations of those topics are likely to uncover information relevant to the
purported inquiries. Nor is there any method for converting the results of those
examinations into numerical values that have been scientifically or statistically
demonstrated to have any predictive accuracy. This precludes the calculation of
“actual re-identification risk” from serving as an objective measure. Likewise,
there is no objective criteria for defining the limits of what the parties can select
for their “acceptable risk thresholds.”
The vulnerabilities arising from the dearth of unambiguous or measurable
requirements are compounded by manifest conflicts-of-interest created by these
permissive guidelines. The guidelines, for example, allow healthcare
organizations who are financially benefiting from labeling their identifiable
patient information as “de-identified” to play a dispositive role in selecting its
own “acceptable risk threshold” and in determining the substance and
effectiveness of the broker’s data use agreement, security and privacy practices,
conflicts-of-interest and commercial motivations. This, in turn, gives the
healthcare organizations dispositive influence over the purportedly objective
calculation of “actual re-identification risk.” The guidelines do not acknowledge
the conflicts-of-interest they create, and thereby include no mechanisms for
mitigating their influence. As such, they are ripe for abuse by parties who seek the
imprimatur of a “process” for labeling identifiable medical records as “deidentified.” These guidelines are incapable of distinguishing between healthcare
organizations and brokers who have no desire to abuse patient privacy from those
that do.
Analytically, the permissive “de-identification guidelines” will remain a
viable differential privacy framework until they effectively address identification
risks arising from combining multiple data sources. The types of data routinely
available to data brokers about specific patients includes information from other
care settings, longitudinal data, information about relatives and household
members who may have overlapping healthcare histories. Any method that only
measures the “identifiability” of each individual data source on its own – or solely
in combination with public records – fails to consider the many situations where
combinations of nominally “de-identified” information can be used to identify
patients.
As previously discussed, for example, the Sweeny study indicated that
87% of the U.S. population could be identified using only their gender, date of
birth and zip code.278 If a data broker possessed identification codes for 200
million patients that are linked to their gender, date of birth and zip code, the
278
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broker would possess the ability to compromise 174 million of those
identification codes. The broker’s ability to link those 174 million identification
codes to the correct patients is 100%. This vulnerability exists even if no single
data source contains all of the necessary indirect identifiers. If the broker has one
dataset that only includes each of the patients’ gender and age, and then purchases
a second dataset that has their zip codes, the broker now possesses enough
information that could be used to identify 174 million individuals.
This is a general phenomenon, and thus can arise from longitudinal
records about the same patient that come from a single source, as was shown in
the lab results study discussed earlier where researchers identified patients in a
database of biometric information that had been redacted in accordance with
Section 514(b)(2)(i). 279 The study found that the ability to identify patients
represented in the database increased dramatically when researchers could
compare it to the patient’s longitudinal health information.280 When researchers
could utilize the known results for four consecutive PCV panels, for example,
they had 19.5% chance of uniquely identifying a patient in the redacted
biomedical database.281 And when researchers had access to six consecutive
panels, the rate jumped to 89%.282
These “de-identification guidelines” also lack a way to effectively model
the identification risk of databases comprising multiple individuals. Averaging is
incapable of describing the systemic risk arising from including increasing
numbers of individuals in a single database. The likelihood of being able to
identify “at least one” patient – or “at least n-number of patients” – from an everincreasing database, for example, cannot be adequately modeled by simply
averaging all of the patients’ isolated risk scores. Nor can averaging effectively
describe identification risk arising from patients who may be related to one
another in a way that increases their respective risk of identification. Nor can
averaging depict how the compromise of one patient’s identity increases the
identification risk to other patients in the same database, creating cascading
identification scenarios.
The American Medical Association’s recently issued AMA PRIVACY
PRINCIPLES describes “appropriate de-identification” as “using techniques that are
demonstrably robust, scalable, transparent, and provable.”283 The current
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articulations of permissive “de-identification guidelines” fail all four of those
criteria.
E.

The Elephant in the Room

Independent standards bodies often partner with regulators and academic
researchers to create thoroughly vetted industry standards for handling sensitive
information. These standards address legal requirements and continuously
evolving use-cases and security risks. They are also used by independent testing
labs to audit companies to ensure that they are complying with those practices.
The Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council is a standards body that
maintains standards for technologies that protect credit card numbers and
validates auditing procedures for ensuring compliance with those standards.284
The National Institute of Standards and Technology plays a similar role for
technologies protecting sensitive information, such as cryptographic
algorithms.285
There is no equivalent oversight over the protection of medical records
that have been labeled “de-identified.” On the contrary, “[t]he trade in patient data
is so opaque that many even in health care and government do not know about
it.”286 The moment that healthcare organizations apply the label “de-identified” to
their patients’ medical records – regardless of how easily they can be used to
identify the patients – all proactive oversight appears to vanish. This has led to the
remarkable circumstance where a patient’s credit card number is currently given
substantially greater protection than her identifiable medical records that have
been labeled “de-identified.”
If your cardholder data is compromised, for example, you have reasonable
assurance that this will be detected and that you will be notified about what data
was compromised and what actions you should take to protect yourself. This
contrasts sharply with how your medical information is protected the moment the
label “de-identified” is slapped onto it.
It is unclear whether there is proactive oversight once your medical
records are labeled “de-identified,” regardless of how easily those records can be
appropriately de-identified (using techniques that are demonstrably robust, scalable, transparent,
and provable …”) [hereinafter AMA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES].
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used to identify you. Compromise of your identifiable “de-identified” medical
records may or may not be detected. Even if it is detected, you may not be
informed. Because your medical records have been labeled “de-identified,” a
broker may decide to use and disclose your information in ways that would be
prohibited under the Privacy Rule if the identifiability of those records were
acknowledged. Even if a broker does not directly sell your medical records to
your health insurer or your employer, the broker may decide to “train” algorithms
and create and then sell a “propensity model” or a “risk score” about you based on
your medical records and identification code. They would be sold as “predictions”
about you notwithstanding the fact that those “predictions” convey information
derived from your actual medical records.
The current gaps in the proactive enforcement of HIPAA’s requirements
have prompted the AMA to call for greater effective oversight – in its recent
AMA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, it called for entities to “make their de-identification
processes and techniques publicly available.”287
Four brief provisions of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule – Sections 514(a)-(c) and
502(d) – are all that safeguards the petabytes worth of patient information for
hundreds of millions of Americans. It is critical, therefore, that the requirements
of these provisions are understood, enforced and complied with.
For healthcare organizations, compliance starts with being informed of
their obligations under the Privacy Rule. Unless all of Section 514(b)-(c)’s
requirements are fully satisfied, the health information in question remains
individually identifiable health information subject to HIPAA’s comprehensive
data protection requirements. Furthermore, even after information has been deidentified, healthcare organizations cannot forget that it is always possible it will
revert back into identifiable health information and, thereby, once again be
subject to HIPAA’s protections.288 Nor can healthcare organizations disregard
widely known risks to patient privacy arising from implementations of
identification codes or the aggregation of patient information that can be used to
identify patients. HIPAA’s Security and Breach Notification Rules do not permit
healthcare organizations to remain “willfully ignorant” of “potential risks and
vulnerabilities” to information that can be used to identify patients.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regulators have a central role to play in fostering transparency and
accountability. There are many red flags indicating that a significant amount of
health information labeled “de-identified” can be used to identify many, most or
even all of the patients involved. The first step regulators should take, therefore, is
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to stay informed about how “de-identification” is actually being conducted in
commercial settings by exercising their compliance review authority.289 Second,
regulators should report their findings so that “de-identification” practices can be
independently reviewed by data protection researchers to ensure that they align
with HIPAA’s express requirements and utilize up-to-date safeguards to address
current uses and accompanying threats. Third, regulators should use those
learnings to update existing guidance to ensure that all of requirements listed in
Sections 514(b)-(c) and 502(b) are appropriately accounted for. Given the
extraordinary sensitivity of health information, regulators should promote the
adoption of documented industry standards for the use of identification codes and
de-identification that are no less sophisticated than what exists in cryptography or
other mature confidentiality domains.
Even if regulatory bodies are slow to act, advocates have been successful
in bringing private claims against healthcare organizations that violate HIPAA’s
requirements. Although HIPAA does not give patients an express private right of
action, courts have routinely found that HIPAA and its implementing regulations
may be utilized to inform the standard of care applicable to claims arising from
the inappropriate disclosure of patient information.290 Healthcare organizations
that disclose health information that can be used to identify their patients to
entities that would not be otherwise entitled to receive it under HIPAA’s Privacy
Rule violate HIPAA’s requirements. And healthcare organizations that receive a
payment in exchange for disclosing such information may also be violating
HIPAA’s prohibition against selling it without the patient’s written
authorization.291 In situations where laws remain unenforced, direct litigation may
be the final avenue available to patients seeking to protect their privacy against
the mislabeling of their clearly identifiable information as “de-identified.”
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